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Essays in Asset Management: Long Horizon Investing
Charikleia Kaffe
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three related essays that contribute to the literature on the behavior of
institutional investors and particularly endowments - distinctive because of their long horizon.
The vast majority of endowments delegate the management of their assets to external managers.
My first essay provides evidence that decisions taken by endowments about their external investment
manager appointments (and terminations) are influenced by the behavior of their peers. This analysis
exploits a novel hand-collected dataset on U.S. university endowments and their external investment
manager appointments across all the main asset classes for each year over 1978-2008. The study
documents that endowments are more likely to appoint the same external manager if their peers
do so, are more active in hiring and firing managers when their peers are more active and respond
faster to hiring and firing decisions by their peers in respect of a given external manager.
The second essay examines the network connections between endowments and Private Equity
(PE) managers. Buyout (BO) and Venture Capital (VC) investment networks are examined sep-
arately. Using data from 1988 to 2008, I identify the characteristics of the centrally located en-
dowments and managers in the network. While VC networks were more developed than their BO
counterparts at the beginning of the sample period, both networks grew denser over time in terms
of number of players and connections. The identity of their key institutions (central endowments
and managers) stayed the same throughout the period examined. Centrally located managers have
better investment returns and win new endowment mandates in subsequent periods. Personal con-
nections between individuals working at endowments and BO firms also play an important role in
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manager selection by endowments.
The third essay examines the long-term evolution of the investment strategy of U.S. university
endowments, using a unique long-term dataset on characteristics and asset allocations from 1900
to 2016 of twelve important endowments. The analysis documents their early adoption of equity
investing in the 1930s and their more recent shift into alternative assets from the 1980s. The
essay then considers whether endowments famed for their long horizon exploit this advantage to
invest countercyclically during periods of market turbulence. I find that endowments do exhibit
countercyclical behaviour, decreasing their allocation to risky assets during the run-up to a crisis
and increasing it after the onset of a crisis.
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Introduction
This dissertation consists of three related essays in asset management and long-horizon invest-
ing, focusing on the investments of university endowments in the United States. Endowments are
distinctive among investors in having long-term investment objectives, consistent with preserving
intergenerational equity (Tobin (1974)). The investment styles of endowments have gained increased
attention in recent years for their favorable returns and use of alternative assets. The “U.S. Endow-
ment Model”, also called the “Yale Model” as it was developed by David Swensen at Yale University,
has three main distinctive features: a bias towards equities and equity-like assets, a strong preference
for delegating to and selecting idiosyncratic active managers, and a large allocation to alternative
assets, including buyouts (BO), venture capital (VC) and hedge funds (Swensen (2009)). This in-
vestment style has been copied by many university endowments and other institutional investors
since it first appeared.
During the past few decades, plan sponsors have shifted towards a delegated portfolio man-
agement model (Blake et al. (2013)). Asset owners choose to have a large portion of their assets
managed externally and to award mandates in both public and private markets to specialist in-
vestment management firms. The selection of external managers is an important strategic decision
for asset owners as it determines their relative performance to their peers. This practice creates
a complex network of connections between external managers (who each oversee a portion of the
portfolio of an asset owner), and asset owners employing the same investment managers. Such a
network allows for interactions between institutions.
My dissertation focuses on a particular class of asset owner, namely endowment funds. I exploit
an extensive hand-collected data set on U.S. university endowments to study the factors influencing
their external investment manager selection and the evolution of their investment strategy over the
long run. The essays contribute to the literature along several dimensions. First, I examine the
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determinants of external manager selection in public and private markets, including the importance
of peer effects. My second essay studies the importance of professional and personal network con-
nections in asset management, with a focus on private markets. The third essay examines the asset
allocation strategies of the most important university endowments since the beginning of the 20th
century and whether they behave countercyclically around times of financial crises, consistent with
their long horizon.
The dissertation is structured as follows:
The first essay provides evidence that the behavior of peer institutions plays a role in decisions
by asset owners about external investment manager appointments and terminations. Prior literature
has focused on peer effects and herding in security or asset class selection of individual and institu-
tional investors, as well as in strategic corporate decisions. This study is the first to address peer
effects when asset owners choose which external investment managers to delegate their portfolio to.
This analysis exploits a hand-collected dataset on external investment manager appointments by
U.S. university endowments across all the main asset classes, spanning over 30 years (1978-2008).
The essay studies the determinants of the commonalities in external manager selection among insti-
tutions, the influence of peers in the frequency of manager appointments and terminations, and the
determinants of how fast institutions respond to hiring and firing decisions of other institutions.
My main findings are that the more similar endowments are in terms of institutional character-
istics (such as Carnegie Classification, geographic location and asset size), the more similar manager
appointments they tend to make. Endowments are more likely to hire and fire managers if their
peers hired or fired managers with higher frequency in the past. A higher average number of past
hirings and firings by peers has a positive effect on the number of manager hiring and firing events
by an endowment during the following year. The study shows that endowments respond faster to
hiring and firing decisions of other endowments when their institutional characteristics are similar.
Looking at the managers hired by two or more institutions, I track the time interval between pairs
of endowments appointing the same manager and find that when differences in characteristics are
smaller, the interval between appointments or terminations of the same manager is shorter. Over-
all, the results provide evidence that peer effects play a significant role in the selection of external
investment managers by asset owners such as university endowments.
The second essay studies the importance of network connections in asset management by focusing
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on private investments. I undertake network analysis to examine how endowments and PE managers
- Buyouts (BO) and Venture capital (VC) - gain access to each other through their institutional and
personal connections. An analysis of delegated portfolio management in a social network context is
important because it highlights a crucial yet under-researched topic, namely the ability of institutions
to exploit their firm- and individual-level connections in making investment decisions. Network
connections are created when endowments give PE managers a portion of their assets to manage.
My analysis confirms the shift of endowment portfolios towards PE investments in recent years, both
in terms of portfolio asset allocation and increasing number of investment managers used.
There are several important findings in this study. First, endowment centrality relates posi-
tively to measures of size, especially for VC networks, while manager centrality relates negatively
to measures of asset size and the managers’ age, suggesting that the smaller and younger managers
are getting hired by the most well-connected endowments. Second, with regards to the network
structures, VC networks were more developed than their BO counterparts at the beginning of the
sample, both in terms of players and the connections between them. Whilst both networks have
grown denser over time, the identity of their key institutions (central endowments and managers)
has stayed the same throughout the period examined. In particular, large endowments, supporting
old universities with many students tend to stay in a central network location for a prolonged pe-
riod. Third, network positioning appears important for PE managers. A high manager centrality is
related to better investment performance and more subsequent hirings by other university endow-
ments. These results suggest that external PE managers can exploit their position to expand their
client base and grow their assets. Fourth, professional and educational connections of individuals
working in investment management matter for manager selection in private markets. Endowments
are more likely to allocate funds to PE managers if their employees/partners are alumni of the school
the endowment supports, or if they have worked in the investment management function of that
endowment in the past.
The third essay examines the investment strategy evolution of U.S. university endowments and
their investing behavior around the most important financial crises since the beginning of the 20th
century. The study uses a unique long-term dataset on endowment characteristics and allocations
from 1900 to 2016 of twelve important U.S. university endowments. The evolution of their investment
strategy exhibits two major shifts in asset allocation: from bonds to stocks in the 1930s and from
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stocks to alternative assets in the 1980s. Moreover, the Ivy League schools (and notably, Harvard, 
Yale, and Princeton) led the way in these asset allocation moves in both eras. I explore the rationale 
behind these major shifts in investment strategy.
In this essay, I also consider whether these supposedly long-horizon investors behave as such 
by analyzing their asset allocation responses before and after financial crises. More specifically, I 
examine their behavior at the time of the six “worst” crises in the U.S. since 1900 as defined by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009): 1906-1907, 1929, 1937, 1973-74, 2000 and 2008. In each episode, I 
compute the active change in the allocation to “risky assets”, defined as equities and alternative 
assets. I decompose the total change in risky asset allocations into a passive change (due to the 
overall market movement) and an active change (due to rebalancing decisions taken by the endow-
ment). Typically, during the run-up to a crisis, these endowments actively decrease their risky asset 
allocation; while after the onset of the crisis, they actively increase the allocation as asset prices fall. 
This evidence suggests that endowments tend to invest countercyclically, in accordance with their 
long-term horizon.
The final chapter of the dissertation concludes with some implications of my research to date and 
suggestions for further research.
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1. Peer Effects in Investment Manager Selection:
Evidence from University Endowments
Abstract
This paper provides evidence that the behavior of peer institutions plays a role in decisions
by asset owners about external investment manager appointments and terminations. The anal-
ysis exploits a novel hand-collected dataset on U.S. university endowments and their external
investment manager appointments across all the main asset classes over 30 years. The findings
document that endowments are more likely to appoint the same external manager if their peers
do so, are more active in hiring and firing managers when their peers are more active and respond
faster to hiring and firing decisions by their peers in respect of a given external manager. This
study is the first to address peer effects when asset owners choose which external investment
managers to delegate their portfolio to.
Keywords: Delegated investment management, manager selection, peer effects, herding, university
endowments
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1 Introduction
This paper examines peer effects as a determinant of external investment manager selection in
the institutional investor space. The literature has previously focused on peer effects and herding
in security or asset class selection of individual and institutional investors, as well as in strategic
firm decisions and corporate policy. This study is the first to address peer effects when institutional
investors choose to which external investment managers to delegate their portfolio. Such an analysis
is enabled through a novel hand-collected dataset on university endowment manager appointments
spanning over 30 years.
University endowments are entities that manage non-profit assets. Endowments are substantial
investors with very long-term horizons, are run by experienced professionals, and have served as
investment role-models for many individual and institutional investors.1 Each endowment has an
investment office that decides on investment policy and can choose to manage the funds itself (inter-
nally) or to delegate management to external asset management firms. Outsourcing the investment
management of endowment portfolios has become quite prevalent in recent years. Regarding this
trend, Mr Narv Narvekar, CEO of Harvard Management Company (HMC), noted in a memo to
the university in 2017 that “in the past, HMC’s unique approach of investing in internally-managed
portfolios generated superior returns. In recent years, however, the tremendous flow of capital to
external managers has created a great deal of competition for both talent and ideas, therefore mak-
ing it more difficult to attract and retain the necessary investment expertise while also remaining
sufficiently nimble to exploit rapidly changing opportunities”. All endowments in the sample in
2008 adopt the external management approach (at least for part of their investment portfolio) and
delegate mandates to investment managers expecting them to deliver performance. If they do not,
then they are often fired.
I investigate external manager hiring and firing decisions by endowments which effectively com-
pete against each other on investment performance (Acharya and Dimson (2007)). Since they ef-
fectively participate in a tournament, their investment strategies and external manager hiring and
firing decisions are likely to be influenced by the behavior of their peers. Furthermore, since some
endowments appear able to pick skilled managers (Lerner et al. (2008)) for most of the period that
1The 2016 total market value of non-profit U.S. endowments was $0.7 trillion (Dahiya and Yermack (2018)).
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I examine, I consider whether others are able to follow their decisions through peer networks.
This paper studies the influence of the network of university peers in external manager hiring and 
firing decisions. In particular, I examine the following three research questions: (i) What are the 
determinants of the commonalities in external manager selection among endowments? (ii) Do 
endowments follow their peers in the frequency of manager appointments and terminations; and (iii) 
What influences how fast endowments respond to hiring and firing decisions of other institutions?
First, I find that the more similar endowments are (especially in terms of Carnegie Classification, 
location and market value), the more likely they are to hire the same managers.2 Second, I find 
that endowments are more likely to hire and fire managers if their peers hired or fired managers 
with higher frequency in the past. I show that a higher average number of past hirings and firings 
by peers has a positive effect on the number of manager hiring and firing events by an endowment 
during the following year. In separate regressions, the number of manager hiring and firing events 
also rises when their peer endowments are hiring or firing more managers on average than the 
whole sample of institutions (isolating the decisions of peers from the general trend). Finally, I 
show that endowments respond faster to hiring and firing decisions of other endowments when their 
institutional characteristics are similar. Looking at the managers hired by two or more institutions, 
I track the time interval between pairs of endowments appointing the same manager and find that 
when differences in characteristics are smaller, the interval between appointments or terminations of 
the same manager is shorter. This result suggests that endowments track more closely the specific 
manager hiring and firing behavior of endowments similar to them. Overall, the results provide 
evidence that peer effects play a significant role in the selection of external investment managers by 
university endowments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature on peer 
effects and networks, investment manager selection and endowment investing. Section 3 describes 
the data sources and matching, the final sample and its trends. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results of the manager selection and peer effects analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education classifies educational institutions with respect to
the degrees they offer. Such classifications include doctoral (offering PhDs), masters, bachelor, associate, theology,
medical and specialty colleges. For more information, see: http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/.
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2 Related Literature
This paper examines the influence of peer institutions on the external manager selection and
termination by university endowments. Therefore, it lies at the intersection of the literature on
networks and peer effects, institutional investor manager selection, and endowment investing.
There is an extensive literature on institutional and individual investors exploring herding and
tournament effects. Early work on herding has shown that managers tend to “go with the flow” and
invest similarly to other managers in their peer groups. Lakonishok et al. (1992), in their empirical
investigation of U.S. pension fund data, note that "Managers are evaluated against each other. To
avoid falling behind a peer group by following a unique investment strategy, they have an incentive
to hold the same stocks as other money managers”. Examining manager incentives, Maug and
Naik (1995) develop a model showing that fund managers tend to ignore their own information and
adjust their portfolio allocation to that of their peers. Grinblatt et al. (1995) examine the tendency
of mutual funds to get into similar positions in the same stocks at the same time, while Hong et al.
(2005) claim that a mutual fund manager is more likely to buy (or sell) a particular stock if other
managers in the same city are buying (or selling) that same stock. More recently, Jiang and Verardo
(2018) show a negative relationship between herding behavior and skill in mutual funds, while other
papers examine herding behavior in different types of institutional investors (such as pension funds
(Blake et al. (2017)) or passive funds (Fisch et al. (2018))) and markets (such as futures (Boyd et al.
(2016)) or bonds (Cai et al. (2019))). This literature considers herding in the selection of stocks
and other securities, while this study addresses herding by asset owners in the selection of external
investment managers.
Social learning and peer effects have gained increased attention in many areas of economics and
finance and have been investigated in recent studies of firms, individual and institutional investors.
Social networks play a significant role in identifying information transfers in the security markets.
Ozsoylev et al. (2014) claim that information diffusion influences trader behavior and returns, and
that traders central to the network earn higher returns and trade earlier than peripheral ones.
Hochberg et al. (2007) look at networks of venture capital firms and find that better-networked firms
experience significantly better performance (IPO exits). Rossi et al. (2018) suggest that network
centrality of equity managers of U.K. pension plans is positively related to risk-adjusted performance
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and growth in assets under management. Li and Schürhoff (2019) find that dealers in the over-
the-counter municipal bond market form trading networks with other dealers to mitigate search
frictions. In the field of corporate boards and governance, Kuhnen (2009) concludes that directors
tend to hire advisory firms that they have worked with in the past, while Nguyen (2012) finds that
a CEO well-connected with the board of directors does not get fired easily after bad performance
and is more likely to find a good job later. In addition, Cohen et al. (2008) connect mutual fund
managers and corporate board members and find that portfolio managers place larger bets and
generate significantly better performance on firms they are connected to.3 The aforementioned
studies measure network connections in an indirect way (for example, through shared attributes such
as educational background), since direct connections between fund managers (or between managers
and corporate CEOs) are generally informal and undocumented. This paper examines peer effects
in the institutional investor space and identifies peer institutions in a unique way, as classified by
the universities themselves.
In corporate policy, Leary and Roberts (2014) show that peer firms play a very important role in
determining corporate capital structures and financial policies. Kaustia and Rantala (2015) find that
firms are more likely to split their stocks if their peer firms have recently done so and Matsumoto
et al. (2018) show that the likelihood of a firm voluntarily providing an earnings forecast is sensitive
to the extent to which other firms in the same geographic area provide earnings forecasts. With
respect to portfolio similarities of investment funds, Antón and Polk (2014) look at commonalities
in stock ownership by mutual fund investors and show that the degree of shared ownership forecasts
cross-sectional variation in return correlation, while Getmansky et al. (2018) show that insurers
with more similar portfolios have larger subsequent common sales. This paper looks at endowment
similarities regarding pools of external managers, explores their manager hiring and firing decisions
and the determinants of commonalities in these choices.
With regards to manager selection and termination decisions in the institutional investor space,
Goyal and Wahal (2008) examine plan sponsors and show that the performance of fired managers is
no different from the performance of newly hired ones. Therefore the expertise of plan sponsors in
3Other related papers falling into the social networks literature are Hong et al. (2004) who suggest that measures
of sociability are linked to increased stock market participation, Gaspar and Massa (2011) who find that personal
connections between divisional managers and the CEO increase the bargaining power of the connected managers and
decrease the efficiency of decisions within the organization, and Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) who show that investors
are more likely to enter the stock market after their neighbors have enjoyed above average portfolio returns.
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delegating assets to institutional investment management firms does not generate excess returns. In
a related study, Cornell et al. (2017) claim that it is more profitable to evaluate a manager’s strategy
and firm characteristics than to make decisions based on historical performance. Lastly, Brown et al.
(2016) show that the amount of private information that institutional investors acquire from hedge
funds influences their decisions to invest. This paper closely examines the external manager hiring
and firing decisions of endowments including another factor that can play a critical role in their
decision-making, namely competition and information-sharing with peer institutions.
Finally, there have been a number of studies of university endowments - the focus of this pa-
per. The U.S. endowment model, often attributed to Yale University, is an investment approach
relying on diversification, active management, equity orientation and illiquid assets (Chambers and
Dimson (2013), Chambers and Dimson (2015), Chambers et al. (2015)). The prior literature has
commended endowment investment decisions and performance, suggesting that U.S. university en-
dowments might have the ability to outperform other types of investors, which makes it important
to explore their investment manager decisions.4 Lerner et al. (2008), who investigate the factors
behind university endowment success, attribute the dramatic growth in endowment size to high in-
vestment returns related to the quality of student body and use of alternative assets, and document
that Ivy League schools managed their commitments to alternative investments much better than
non-Ivy League schools. Endowments have also been successful in their security selection process,
especially in terms of venture capital partnerships, as examined by Lerner et al. (2007). More recent
literature, however, finds that endowments’ superior performance is driven mostly from their access
to top-performing venture capital partnerships, and disappears after 2000 (Sensoy et al. (2014)).
Sensoy et al. (2014) attribute this erosion of endowments’ advantages to a maturation of the private
equity industry. Moreover, endowments seem to directly benefit from having experts in alternative
investments serving on university boards (Binfare et al. (2018)). The literature has also shown that
endowments operate in a highly competitive environment and are adjusting their asset allocations
to catch up with competing institutions (Goetzmann and Oster (2012)), which suggests that other
investment decisions might also be influenced by their peer groups.
All the above suggest that external manager selection is an important strategic decision for asset
4Other papers studying endowment risk-taking, spending rules and payouts are Brown et al. (2010), Brown et al.
(2014), and Dimmock (2012).
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owners such as pension funds and endowments, and make it reasonable to expect that peer effects 
play a critical role.
3 Data on Endowments and External Managers
I employ a novel dataset of university endowments and their external investment managers 
across all asset class mandates for 1977-2008. The main data source of endowment managers are the 
annual NACUBO reports.5 After 2008, these reports no longer disclosed this manager information. 
From this panel data set, I am able to infer all manager hiring and firing events each year from 
changes in the annual lists of managers employed by each endowment. This data is supplemented 
by existing datasets on endowment characteristics (NACUBO), university characteristics (IPEDS) 
and separate account investment manager characteristics (PSN Enterprise, Broadridge Marketplace, 
Nelson’s Directory of Investment Managers).
3.1 Data Sources
NACUBO
The endowment managers data is hand-collected from a series of annual reports by NACUBO. 
Since 1970, NACUBO has distributed yearly surveys to university endowments asking questions 
regarding their investment practices. From 1977-2008, endowments listed their external investment 
managers in a section of the NACUBO report which was discontinued from 2009 onwards. To the 
best of my knowledge, this section of the NACUBO reports has not been tabulated and analyzed in 
the past.
Table 1 shows the variables included in the NACUBO reports under the “Investment Managers” 
section each year. External investment manager names are reported from 1977, and asset class 
breakdown from 1978 onwards. For a smaller part of the sample, the asset class mandates are 
further refined with the manager’s allocation to mandates in the US or internationally from 1988, 
and NACUBO’s “Type” and “Style” asset classifications since 2002. More specifically, “Geography” 
represents the location of the portfolio investments (Domestic, International or Foreign), “Type”
5The National Association of College and Business Officers (NACUBO) is an advocacy organization devoted to
improving management practices in the higher education industry.
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represents mandates such as large cap or small cap for public equities, hedge funds or private equity 
for alternative investments, and “Style” represents mandates such as growth or value for equities, 
short or long-term for fixed income. Lastly, for 1995-2005, the “% of pool” represents the percentage 
of the investment portfolio delegated to each manager.
Despite participating in the NACUBO surveys, not all university endowments report their exter-
nal investment managers in the “Investment Managers” section. Table A.1 in the Appendix reports 
the yearly percentage of institutions reporting their managers. I identify a university as not report-
ing managers if it reports its annual market value in the NACUBO report, but declines to respond 
to the “Investment Managers” section of the report. Universities managing their assets internally 
(for all or part of their mandates) tend to also indicate this in the “Investment Managers” section. 
Through the sample period, the proportion of universities reporting every year ranges from 81% to 
98%. There also seems to be no selection bias in terms of size of those endowments that disclose 
their managers.
The asset class categories and mandates are sometimes reported differently throughout the sam-
ple. Therefore, to keep the sample consistent through time and make sure the hiring/firing events I am 
capturing are not affected by yearly differences in mandate reporting, I classify the different asset 
classes in reasonable groups that stay constant over time (Table A.2 of the Appendix). These trans-
formations provide broad and uniform classifications of asset types, which are particularly useful as 
classification of assets differs not only from year to year but also from endowment to endowment 
(for example, a hedge fund investing in distressed commercial mortgages might be defined as a mar-
ketable alternative strategy for one endowment, a distressed debt fund for another endowment, or 
even as a private equity real estate fund for a different endowment (Ang et al. (2018))). Grouping 
asset classes minimizes these reporting biases. Last, I take into account cases of introductions or 
discontinuations of asset classes (for example, introduction of a balanced mandate in the portfolio 
instead of separate stock and bond mandates). In these cases, I identify the hirings and firings using 
only the manager names from the consecutive reports.7
The NACUBO data also contains yearly cross-sectional characteristics of the endowment port-
7For example, let us consider an endowment that changes its mandate reporting from Balanced to Stock/Bonds.
If Manager A was employed by the endowment for a Balanced mandate in 1998 and is still employed by it in 1999
under a Stock and Bond mandate, then I identify no hiring/firing decision.
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folios such as market values, asset allocation and nominal returns.8 This part of the NACUBO
data has already been used in several prior studies of endowment investing, including Lerner et al.
(2008), Brown et al. (2010) and Barber and Wang (2013). The NACUBO data are not backfilled,
and are virtually free of survivorship and reporting bias (Barber and Wang (2013)). Lastly, the
NACUBO survey has a very high annual rate of compliance by endowments (Goetzmann and Oster
(2012)). However, very large elite institutions such as the Ivy League Schools stopped reporting
their managers in the “Investment Management” section of the NACUBO reports in 1998.
IPEDS
I source data on the characteristics of the universities which own endowments from IPEDS.9
The data includes university-specific variables such as the name of the university, Zip Code, state,
Carnegie Classification, public or private university status, age since the university was founded,
total university income, costs, assets and debt, tuition and appropriations, total applicants and ap-
plicants admitted, and full-time equivalent (FTE) students. Providing information through IPEDS
is mandatory for all U.S. post-secondary institutions, and institutions failing to provide information
are barred from accessing federal funding (Brown et al. (2012)).
Chronicle of Higher Education
I identify university peers through a 2012 study of 1,595 U.S. universities and colleges conducted
by the Chronicle of Higher Education. Each year colleges submit "comparison groups" to the U.S.
Department of Education to get feedback on how their institution compares to other universities in
terms of finances, enrollment, and other measures tabulated in IPEDS. The groups sometimes repre-
sent a college’s actual peers but more often reveal their aspirations (Fuller (2012)). The Chronicle’s
study reports the following information about each university: a list of the universities it consid-
ers to be its peers, a list of the universities which consider it to be their peer and the overlap of
these two lists.10 This data provides a helpful indication of peer relationships or aspirations of peer
classifications among U.S. universities, as reported by the universities themselves.
8A more detailed description of this part of the NACUBO data is provided by Brown et al. (2010).
9Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, data submitted to the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES), available since 1984.
10The network of peers as identified from the Chronicle of Higher Education study can be found at:
https://www.chronicle.com/interactives/peers-network
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Investment Manager Datasets
For part of my analysis, I match the managers to the Informa PSN Enterprise database on in-
stitutional managers, which is free from survivorship bias. PSN has data on long-only portfolios
managed on behalf of accredited investors. Product performance information starts in 1979, while
AUM figures are available from 1984.11 This dataset is primarily used by plan sponsors and consul-
tants to track the performance of external investment managers and by these managers themselves
to compare their performance to their peers (Heisler et al. (2007)). For each manager, I source vari-
ables for investment managers such as assets under management (AUM), firm age and performance
of products. I match each endowment manager name to the PSN manager name of the same man-
date. PSN has various products under the same investment manager firm and mandate. Therefore,
I create composite characteristics (such as composite performance, AUM, etc.) of the products of
a particular asset class (equity/fixed income and their styles) and match this performance to the
corresponding endowment manager.12 I also source other manager characteristics such as the fund
location (state and Zip Code), the date the company was founded, the total asset size, the total
number of accounts per product, the firm name changes and their corresponding dates. I supplement
the PSN data with other datasets, such as the Broadridge Marketplace and the Nelson’s Directory
of Investment Managers.
3.2 Manager Selection Characteristics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for universities and their endowments for 1978-2008. The
sample involves a large cross section of institutions which starts at 110 and rises to 722 in number.
The average endowment in 2008 was managing around US$300 million, but the underlying dispersion
in endowment size is large. For example, in 2008 Harvard was managing US$36 billion while Georgia
Perimeter College was managing only around US$600,000. About 30% of the universities belong
to the “Doctoral” Carnegie classification (they offer PhD degrees). Overall, the sample consists of
1,386 unique universities employing around 5,800 investment managers spanning various asset class
categories (equities, bonds, alternative assets, real estate, cash and subcategories of the above) over
11See Busse et al. (2010) for more details on the data.
12I create the composites because the variation in the performance of the products of the same manager for the
same mandate is low.
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30 years.
The average endowment has dramatically increased the number of external managers it employs
since 1978, as seen in Figure 1. This outsourcing of the management of the endowment to multiple
investment managers has become very prevalent, and Sharpe (1981) refers to it as “decentralized
investment management”. Blake et al. (2013) also discuss the tendency towards decentralized in-
vestment management in pension funds that move from balanced to specialist managers and from
single to multiple managers in each asset class. In this way, pension funds can diversify the skills
of specialist active managers having superior knowledge of a particular asset class (Sharpe (1981),
Van Binsbergen et al. (2008)).
Figure 1 classifies institutions into “Ivy League” schools, “Doctoral” Carnegie classification schools,
and the remaining “Non-Doctoral” institutions. I use the “Doctoral” classification as a proxy for
prestigious institutions, as the “Ivy league” schools stop reporting their managers after 1998. These
prestigious institutions have been consistently employing more managers on average than the rest
of the universities, a pattern also similar in terms of endowment size - on average, large institutions
employ more managers than smaller ones (about 30 vs 15 managers on average in 2008).13 Table
3 shows that endowments, on average, manage less than 10% of their AUM internally and hence
delegate more than 90% of their portfolio to external managers.
I break down the rise in the average number of managers employed by asset class in Figure 2. In
late 1970s and early 1980s, university endowments employed investment managers in only two asset
classes, namely domestic equities and domestic fixed income. Gradually, they started introducing
managers to balanced mandates and alternative investments. Most notably, the increase in the
average number of investment managers mainly comes from the increase in the number of managers
in equity and alternative assets. A similar upward trend in the asset allocation to equities (1970-
1980s) and alternative assets (1990-2000s) has already been reported in Lerner et al. (2008) and
Brown et al. (2010), and can be analyzed next to the number of investment firms employed to
manage these asset classes.
I examine whether endowments have any tendency to select “local” external managers. This
result relates to a large literature concerned with home bias effects in investments and other strategic
decisions of individuals and firms. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) document a “local bias” in equity
13The size classifications of the endowments and the relevant Figure A.1 can be found in the Appendix.
15
investment within the U.S. market, whereby U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference 
for equities of local firms.14 Table 4 summarizes the average distance of the endowment from the 
headquarters of the equity managers it selects (Endowment Manager Average Distance) compared to 
average distances of all available managers they could have selected (Benchmark Managers Average 
Distance). Table 4 shows that, on average, endowments choose managers they are geographically 
closer to, and that the differences in average distances are statistically significant. Thus, the average 
endowment employs equity managers significantly closer to it than managers in its benchmark, 
a pattern which is also consistent over the long run. There exist several potential reasons why 
geographic closeness to the selected managers might matter for endowments. An explanation could 
be that endowments’ information set about the availability and skill of potential managers is better 
locally, due to better access to local information, a raised sense of trust or a better ability of the 
endowment to assess local managers. Another reason could be that endowments, being institutions 
with a social purpose, might face political (or student) pressure to invest locally. This might be 
particularly true for endowments of public institutions (similar to Hochberg and Rauh (2013) that 
examine public pension funds). In unreported results, I split the sample into private and public 
institutions. I find that after 2000 (where I have a large number of public universities reporting 
compared to the beginning of the period), home bias effects of the same level are prevalent in both 
public and private institutions. This result gives support to the information/trust channel for the 
home bias effect.
As a preliminary indication of commonalities in manager appointments between endowments, 
Figure 3 depicts the number of managers hired by multiple endowments over 5-year rolling periods 
(every second year is reported for brevity). The y axis depicts the number of managers included 
in each 5-year rolling window, and the columns break down this total figure to the number of 
managers hired by 1, 2-5, 6-10, and 11 or more endowments. The figure shows that almost half of 
the managers are employed by more than one endowment. In the empirical analysis of the paper, I 
take this observation further and examine the drivers of this commonality in manager appointments.
14Other papers on home bias: Portes and Rey (2005) show that investors not only over-invest in their home equity
market but they also invest most heavily in markets close to them, while Sørensen et al. (2007) document a home
bias in bond holdings. Home bias effects have also been prevalent in broader contexts such as in trade (Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000)), consumption (Lewis (2010)), and academic research (Karolyi (2016)).
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4 Peer Effects in External Manager Selection
I examine the manager selection by looking at the individual manager appointments of each 
endowment in the sample. Endowments learn about the hiring and firing decisions of their peers 
through the NACUBO reports, the financial press and personal connections, and can be influenced by 
their choices.15 The long history of annual endowment reporting on NACUBO allows me to identify 
hiring and firing events of external managers in every year. I identify a hiring event of a manager in a 
given year if, conditional on the university reporting managers in the Investment Managers section of 
the NACUBO report the same year and the previous one, this manager was not employed during the 
previous year. Similarly, I identify a firing event if, conditional on the university reporting managers 
this year and the next one, this manager is not employed the following year. The hiring and firing 
events are of the order of 20% of the total number of appointments per year. Moreover, large 
endowments tend to hire more managers per year (as a percentage of total appointments) than small 
endowments, but do not tend to fire managers more frequently than the small ones.
In the following sections, I explore peer effects in manager appointments using three different 
specifications. First, I look at the determinants of the commonalities in manager appointments 
of endowment pairs each year. Second, I explore whether endowments follow peers in hiring and 
firing decisions in terms of the number of manager appointments and terminations per year. Third, 
I examine what influences how fast endowments respond to hiring and firing decisions of other 
institutions.
4.1 Manager Commonality
In this section, I identify the institutional characteristics driving the commonality in managers 
selected by any pair of endowments at a particular point in time. The variable of interest is the 
number of common managers employed between each endowment pair, scaled by the sum of unique 
managers hired by both endowments:
Proportion of Manager Commonalityi,j =
CommonManagersi,j
Managersi +Managersj − CommonManagersi,j
(1)
15Participating institutions in the NACUBO survey receive complimentary access to full reports and receive access
to institutionally specific confidential data.
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Similar measures of commonality have been used in the finance literature to calculate common 
ownership of stocks and overlapping holdings by mutual funds (see Antón and Polk (2014) and Pool 
et al. (2015)).
Table 5 reports summary statistics of the number of common managers and the proportion of 
manager commonality in endowment pairs. The average number of common managers across all 
pairs has gone up over time and has a very high dispersion (ranges from 0 to 20 managers in some 
endowment pairs). The average number of common managers for equity and fixed income in 2008 is 
high at 0.37, considering that this average is calculated from all possible pairs of endowments. The 
proportion of manager commonality varies between 0 i.e. when there are no managers in common 
and 1 when all managers employed by the pair are common to them. The average proportion of 
portfolio commonality is around 0.05 for the reasons explained above, but ranges from 0 to 0.75 for 
some endowment pairs.
Next, I explore which institutional characteristics can determine these manager commonalities in 
endowment portfolios. Therefore, I calculate the distances in characteristics of each endowment pair 
in terms of their relative endowment size, total assets, age, “status” (Carnegie Classification) and 
geographic location of the university. I calculate the geographic distances between pairs of universities 
using the NBER “Centroid” dataset from the ZIP Code Distance Database - ZIP Code Tabulation 
Area (ZCTA) Distance Database, which specifies the internal point latitude and longitude for all Zip 
Code tabulation areas in the United States.16 The data gathered from IPEDS also specify the Zip 
Codes of the universities in my sample. I match the university Zip Codes with the NBER 
“Centroid” dataset and, using the latitude and longitude of each area (converted from degrees to 
radians), I calculate the shortest distance in miles between any two university Zip Codes with the 
Haversine formula.
For example, in 1997 Columbia University and Cornell University employed 4 common managers 
out of 68 in total (portfolio commonality at 0.06 for managers in all asset classes). In the same year, 
Columbia University was 111 years older (243 vs 174) and bigger in size by US$900mil (US$3bil vs 
US$2.1bil) than Cornell University. The universities were both 0 Carnegie Classification (both are 
Doctoral institutions) and about 173 miles apart (great-circle distance).
The regression specification is the following:
16NBER ZIP Code Distance Database: http://www.nber.org/data/zip-code-distance-database.html
18
Proportion of Manager Commonalityi,j = a+ β1 ∗MV Disti,j + β2 ∗AgeDisti,j+ (2)
+ β3 ∗GeographicDisti,j + β4 ∗ StatusDisti,j + εi,j
Table 6 reports contemporaneous regressions of the manager commonality measure in endow-
ment portfolios regressed on differences in institutional characteristics. I estimate the regression for 
three representative years in the sample, namely 1984, 1997 and 2008. The negative coefficients 
of the distance explanatory variables show that the more similar the universities are in terms of 
characteristics, the more are the common managers they tend to employ for their portfolios. For 
example, if two universities in 1984 were 2,500 miles closer to one another, they would on average 
employ one additional common manager in a portfolio consisting of around 100 managers (holding 
everything else constant). The characteristics which have stayed important as determinants of man-
ager commonality over time are the geographic location, the market value of the endowment, as well 
as the Carnegie Classification (“Status”).
One might argue that the commonality in managers could be driven by a specific asset class 
in endowments’ portfolios, and more particularly by the illiquid investments that might be more 
resistant to being switched than the liquid ones. To alleviate this concern, in Table A.3, I break down 
the manager commonality result in liquid asset classes (equity and fixed income), and illiquid asset 
classes (alternative assets such as private equity and hedge funds). The commonality in manager 
appointments seems prevalent both in liquid as well as illiquid asset classes. To reinforce my result, I 
also substitute the numerical values of the market value and age distances with their difference in 
percentile rankings of the variables, in a way similar to Antón and Polk (2014).17 Table A.4 of the 
Appendix shows that the baseline results of the regression seem to hold even under this reasonable 
scaling of the explanatory variables.
Overall, the regression analysis shows that commonality in manager appointments by endow-
ments is associated with similarities in their institutional characteristics.
17Along the same lines, Antón and Polk (2014) measure stock similarities through differences in stocks’ percentile
rankings on particular firm characteristics.
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4.2 Peer effects in the frequency of appointments and terminations
In this section, I examine whether endowments tend to hire and fire managers with greater
frequency if their peers have recently done so. I test this hypothesis using two types of specifications,
in both of which the dependent variable of interest is the number of managers hired or fired each
year by an endowment. The main explanatory variable is either the average number of managers
hired/fired by the peer institutions in the past, or a dummy variable resembling the one used in
Kaustia and Rantala (2015).18 This dummy variable takes the value of one if the average number
of managers hired by peers is larger than the average number of managers hired by all endowments,
and zero otherwise. The use of the dummy variable isolates the differential effect of peer decisions
from the general trend. I also include in the regression characteristics such as the lagged market
value and return of the endowment, as well as the university’s age, endowment and time fixed effects.
The specification I use is the following:
NumberManagersHired/F iredi,t = a+ β ∗ PeerHiring/F iring Dummyi,t−1 (3)
+ γ1*∆MVi,t−1,t + γ2*log(Age)i,t−1 + γ3*Returni,t−1 + εi,t
The data from the Chronicle of Higher Education is used to identify peer institutions, as it 
contains the names of peer universities for every university, as reported by the institutions themselves. 
Other peer-matching techniques in the literature that rely on a variety of observable institutional 
characteristics might be insufficient for our purposes. Correctly identifying the network is crucial, 
especially for educational institutions such as endowments, that do not only have financial but also 
social and other goals (such as reputation, social responsibility, support for education, etc.). 
Therefore, I consider the network derived from the Chronicle of Higher Education to be the most 
accurate, “capture-all” representation of the peer relationships.
The dependent variable in the regressions is the annual number of hirings/firings of external 
managers, which  I  can model with a Poisson regression.19 Therefore, the regression assumes that the
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18Kaustia and Rantala (2015) study the influence of peers in stock split decisions, and use a dummy explanatory
variable equal to one if the average number of splits announced by a firm’s peers during the past year is higher than
the corresponding NYSE average, and zero otherwise.
19The regression model takes the following form: if x is a vector of independent variables, then Y can be modeled
as log(E(Y/x)) = α+ β′x. I perform a chi-squared goodness of fit test on the manager hiring and firing data, and I
cannot reject the hypothesis that the data follows a poisson distribution (p-value of the test statistic approaches 1).
dependent variable has a Poisson distribution, and that the logarithm of its expected value can be 
modeled by a linear combination of unknown parameters.20 In separate regressions, I also replace 
the Peer Hiring/Firing Dummy with the average number of managers hired/fired by peers during 
the previous year. Control variables include the change in endowment market value and its age, as 
well as investment return during the previous year.
The one-year lag in the decision to hire/fire managers takes care of the influence of contempora-
neous common shocks to endowments. I also include control variables related to the decision of the 
endowment to hire or fire, such as the change in the market value of the endowment as well as its 
past financial performance. Therefore, the coefficient of the peer hiring/firing variable identifies a 
peer effect on the propensity to hire/fire, under the assumption that other motives for hiring/fire are 
controlled for. Year and endowment fixed effects included in the regressions also take into account 
all common time-varying shocks affecting the perceived desirability of a hiring/firing, as well as 
unobserved endowment-specific characteristics.
Table 7 shows that endowments are more likely to hire and fire managers if their peers hired 
or fired many managers recently. A higher average number of past hirings and firings by peers 
has a positive effect on the number of manager hiring and firing events by an endowment during 
the following year. Moreover, the number of manager hiring and firing events also rises when peer 
endowments are hiring or firing more managers on average than the whole sample of institutions. 
For the hiring result in Column 1, the “Peer Hiring Dummy” is highly significant and indicates that 
if peers have hired more managers than the whole sample during the previous year, the number of 
new manager hirings by the endowment will be higher by 10% (at the mean of the other independent 
variables). Similarly, the main explanatory variable in Column 3, “Hiring Average by Peers”, shows 
that an endowment whose peers hire one more manager than average one year will increase manager 
hirings by around 2% the next year. The regression results for the firing decisions have similar 
interpretations.21
21
20Examples of studies using Poisson regressions to model count variables include Lerner (1995), Hermalin and
Weisbach (1988) and Yermack (1996), who study the determinants of the number of new board members and the
number of director appointments or departures in companies.
21The asset classes examined are both liquid (equity and bonds) and illiquid (private equity and hedge funds). I
appreciate that peer effects could be of different importance among these classes due to the characteristics of their
respective assets. While following peers in liquid asset classes could be straightforward, to do so following other
endowments in illiquid asset classes might not always be feasible because of barriers to replication (constrains in
investment in these PE funds). However, such a possibility would bias my results against finding a peer effect in these
asset classes. Moreover, endowment decision clustering around firing decisions could appear as PE or VC funds reach
These results show that endowments follow their peers in manager hiring and firing decisions,
and are more likely to hire or fire investment managers if their peers have recently done so.
4.3 Response time to appointments and terminations
In this last section of the peer effects analysis, I examine the time endowments take to respond
after peer hiring or firing decisions of specific managers. For every manager hired or fired by two or
more endowments in the sample, I calculate the time (number of years) that elapses between each
pair of endowments hiring/firing this manager. Then, I use the characteristic distances of every pair
of endowments/universities in the year the second endowment in a pair hires or fires the common
manager) to explain the time lag of the events. The characteristic distances calculation is similar to
that of Section 4.1.
I use a time-to-event survival analysis to model the regression. When survival data are right-
censored, two of the most frequently used regression models are the relative risk model (Cox (1972))
and the accelerated failure time (AFT) model (e.g., Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002)). Survival-type
analyses have originated in the field of biostatistics but have been used in various settings in the
finance literature to model issues like bank failure or IPO survival (Lane et al. (1986), Hensler et al.
(1997), Evrensel (2008)). The AFT model is appealing in my setting because it is analogous to the
classical linear regression approach, directly linking the expected time to event (hiring/firing) to
covariates. The regression specification is the following:
Ti = X
T
i β + i (4)
where T is the log-transformed time to event (hiring/firing), X is the covariates vector, β is the
vector of the regression parameters and i is idd. More specifically, a fully-parametric accelerated
failure time model with a log-logistic distribution can exhibit a non-monotonic hazard function which
increases at early times and decreases at later times. This allows me to take into account that earlier
responses to other endowments’ manager appointments and terminations might be more informative
than later ones. Since I only have annual data available, I approximate each response time at the
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maturity and do not get re-invested into by all endowments. Although this might be true in some cases, endowments
could also exit a PE investment through a secondary market transaction, which would also create a firing event in my
dataset. Therefore, clustering due to fund liquidations would be mitigated.
middle point of the time interval (between 0 and 1 year, adding 0.5 years to the time variable). For
example, if the hiring response time between two endowments is 2 years, I estimate this as 2.5 years.
Table 8 shows the results. In the hiring regression, the average response time for a pair of
endowments is 2.5 years. The regression coefficients generally have a positive sign, which means
that the more similar endowments are in their institutional characteristics, the less time they take to
respond to manager hiring and firing of other institutions. For example, if the “geographical distance”
between the endowments decreases by one standard deviation, the manager hiring response time
drops by 16%. The remaining regression coefficients have similar interpretations, and these effects
are stronger in hiring decisions than in firing decisions. This result is consistent with endowments
following closely the decisions of their peers in order to find attractive managers, but behaving more
idiosyncratically when firing managers after having worked with them in the past.
This result shows that endowments are more likely to respond faster to the appointments or
terminations of a specific manager by endowments in their peer group.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses unique long-term data on university endowments to examine the role of peer effects
in their decisions about external investment manager appointments and terminations. I show that
endowments with similar characteristics are more likely to appoint the same external managers, that
endowments follow their peers in the frequency of external manager hiring and firing, and respond
faster to the specific manager hiring and firing decisions of endowments in their peer groups. The
results support the existence of peer effects in university endowments’ decisions about external
investment managers.
Overall, this study sheds light on the external manager selection procedure of institutional in-
vestors with a long investment horizon. The analysis suggests that institutional investor herding
effects are prevalent not only in decisions about their financial assets, but also in decisions about
the investment managers of their portfolios.
23
References
Acharya, S. and Dimson, E. (2007). Endowment Asset Management: Investment Strategies in Oxford
and Cambridge. Oxford University Press, number 9780199210916.
Ang, A., Ayala, A., and Goetzmann, W. N. (2018). Investment beliefs of endowments. European
Financial Management, 24:3–33.
Antón, M. and Polk, C. (2014). Connected Stocks. Journal of Finance, 69(3):1099–1127.
Barber, B. M. and Wang, G. (2013). Do (Some) university endowments earn alpha? Financial
Analysts Journal, 69(5):26–44.
Binfare, M., Brown, G. W., Harris, R. S., and Lundblad, C. T. (2018). How Do Financial Expertise
and Networks Affect Investing? Evidence from the Governance of University Endowments. Darden
Business School Working Paper No. 3187280, Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Research
Paper No. 18-11.
Blake, D., Rossi, A., Timmermann, A., Tonks, I., and Wermers, R. (2013). Decentralized Investment
Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry. Journal of Finance, 68(3):1133–1178.
Blake, D., Sarno, L., and Zinna, G. (2017). The market for lemmings: The herding behavior of
pension funds. Journal of Financial Markets, 36:17–39.
Boyd, N. E., Buyuksahin, B., Haigh, M. S., and Harris, J. H. (2016). The Prevalence, Sources, and
Effects of Herding. Journal of Futures Markets, 36(7).
Brown, G. W., Gredil, O., and Kantak, P. (2016). Finding Fortune: How Do Institutional Investors
Pick Asset Managers? SSRN, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2797874.
Brown, J. R., Dimmock, S. G., Kang, J. K., and Weisbenner, S. J. (2014). How university en-
dowments respond to financial market shocks: Evidence and implications. American Economic
Review, 104(3):931–962.
Brown, J. R., Dimmock, S. G., and Weisbenner, S. (2012). The Supply of and Demand for Charitable
Donations to Higher Education. NBER Working Paper 18389.
24
Brown, K. C., Garlappi, L., and Tiu, C. (2010). Asset allocation and portfolio performance: Evidence
from university endowment funds. Journal of Financial Markets, 13(2):268–294.
Busse, J. A., Goyal, A., and Wahal, S. (2010). Performance and persistence in institutional invest-
ment management. Journal of Finance, 65(2):765–790.
Cai, F., Han, S., Li, D., and Li, Y. (2019). Institutional herding and its price impact: Evidence
from the corporate bond market. Journal of Financial Economics, 131(1):139–167.
Chambers, D. and Dimson, E. (2013). Retrospectives: John Maynard Keynes, Investment Innovator.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3):213–228.
Chambers, D. and Dimson, E. (2015). The British Origins of the US Endowment Model. Financial
Analysts Journal, 71(2):10–14.
Chambers, D., Dimson, E., and Foo, J. (2015). Keynes the Stock Market Investor: A Quantitative
Analysis. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 50(04):843–868.
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., and Malloy, C. (2008). The Small World of Investing: Board Connections
and Mutual Fund Returns. Journal of Political Economy, 116(5):951–979.
Cornell, B., Hsu, J., and Nanigian, D. (2017). Does Past Performance Matter in Investment Manager
Selection? The Journal of Portfolio Management, 43(4):33–43.
Coval, J. D. and Moskowitz, T. J. (1999). Home bias at home: Local equity preference in domestic
portfolios. Journal of Finance, 54(6):2045–2073.
Cox, D. R. (1972). Regression Models with Life Tables. J. of the Royal Statistical Society (B),
34:187–220.
Dahiya, S. and Yermack, D. (2018). Investment Returns and Distribution Policies of Non-Profit
Endowment Funds. European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper
No. 582/2018.
Dimmock, S. G. (2012). Background risk and university endowment funds. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 94(2):789–799.
25
Evrensel, A. Y. (2008). Banking crisis and financial structure: A survival-time analysis. International
Review of Economics and Finance, 17(4):589–602.
Fisch, J., Hamdani, A., and Solomon, S. D. (2018). Passive Investors. Res. Pap. 18-12, Inst. Law
Econ., Univ. Pa. Law Sch., Philadelphia.
Fuller, A. (2012). In Selecting Peers for Comparison’s Sake, Colleges Look Upward. The Chronicle
of Higher Education.
Gaspar, J. M. and Massa, M. (2011). The role of commonality between CEO and divisional managers
in internal capital markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(3):841–869.
Getmansky, M., Girardi, G., Hanley, K. W., Nikolova, S., and Pelizzon, L. (2018). Portfolio Similarity
and Asset Liquidation in the Insurance Industry. SAFE Working Paper No. 224. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3239362.
Goetzmann, W. N. and Oster, S. (2012). Competition among university endowments. NBER
Working Paper No. 18173.
Goyal, A. and Wahal, S. (2008). The selection and termination of investment management firms by
plan sponsors. Journal of Finance, 63(4):1805–1847.
Grinblatt, B. M., Titman, S., and Wermers, R. (1995). Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio
Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior. American Economic Review,
85(5):1088–1105.
Heisler, J., Knittel, C. R., Neumann, J. J., and Stewart, S. (2007). Why do institutional plan
sponsors fire their investment managers? Journal of business and Economic Studies, 13:88–115.
Hensler, D. A., Rutherford, R. C., and Springer, T. M. (1997). The survival of initial public offerings
in the aftermarket. Journal of Financial Research, 20(1):93–110.
Hermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The Determinants of Board Composition. Source: The
RAND Journal of Economics Journal of Economics, 19(4):589–606.
Hochberg, Y. V., Ljungqvist, A., and Lu, Y. (2007). Whom you know matters: Venture capital
networks and investment performance. Journal of Finance, 62(1):251–301.
26
Hochberg, Y. V. and Rauh, J. D. (2013). Local overweighting and underperformance: Evidence
from limited partner private equity investments. Review of Financial Studies, 26(2):403–451.
Hong, H., Kubik, J. D., and Stein, J. C. (2004). Social Interaction and Stock-Market Participation.
Journal of Finance, 59(1):137–163.
Hong, H., Kubik, J. D., and Stein, J. C. (2005). Thy neighbor’s portfolio: Word-of-mouth effects in
the holdings and trades of money managers. Journal of Finance, 60(6):2801–2824.
Jiang, H. and Verardo, M. (2018). Does Herding Behavior Reveal Skill? An Analysis of Mutual
Fund Performance. Journal of Finance, 73(5):2229–2269.
Kalbfleisch, J. D. and Prentice, R. L. (2002). The Statistical Analysis  of  Failure  Time  Data, Wiley
Series in Probability and Statistics, 2nd edition
Karolyi, G. (2016). Home Bias, an Academic Puzzle. Review of Finance, 20(6):2049–2078.
Kaustia, M. and Knüpfer, S. (2012). Peer performance and stock market entry. Journal of Financial
Economics, 104(2):321–338.
Kaustia, M. and Rantala, V. (2015). Social learning and corporate peer effects. Journal of Financial
Economics, 117(3):653–669.
Kuhnen, C. M. (2009). Business networks, corporate governance, and contracting in the mutual
fund Industry. Journal of Finance, 64(5):2185–2220.
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1992). The impact of institutional trading on stock
prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1):23–43.
Lane, W. R., Looney, S. W., and Wansley, J. W. (1986). An application of the cox proportional
hazards model to bank failure. Journal of Banking and Finance, 10(4):511–531.
Leary, M. T. and Roberts, M. R. (2014). Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy? Journal
of Finance, 69(1):139–178.
Lerner, J. (1995). Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms. The Journal of Finance,
50(1):301–318.
27
Lerner, J., Schoar, A., and Wang, J. (2008). Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of University
Endowment Success. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(3):207–222.
Lerner, J., Schoar, A., and Wongsunwai, W. (2007). Smart institutions, foolish choices: The limited
partner performance puzzle. Journal of Finance, 62(2):731–764.
Lewis, K. K. (2010). Trying to Explain Home Bias in Equities and Consumption. Journal of
Economic Literature, 37:571–608.
Li, D. and Schürhoff, N. (2019). Dealer Networks. Journal of Finance, 74(1):91–144.
Matsumoto, D. A., Serfling, M., and Shaikh, S. (2018). Geographic Peer Effects in Man-
agement Earnings Forecasts. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3025002 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3025002.
Maug, E. G. and Naik, N. Y. (1995). Herding and Delegated Portfolio Management: The Impact of
Relative Performance Evaluation on Asset Allocation. IFA Working Paper, pages 223–1996.
Nguyen, B. D. (2012). Does the Rolodex Matter? Corporate Elite’s Small World and the Effective-
ness of Boards of Directors. Management Science, 58(2):236–252.
Obstfeld, M. and Rogoff, K. (2000). The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is
There a Common Cause? In NBER Chapters, pages NBER Macroeconomics Annual 15 (2000):
339–390.
Ozsoylev, H. N., Walden, J., Yavuz, M. D., and Bildik, R. (2014). Investor networks in the stock
market. Review of Financial Studies, 27(5):1323–1366.
Pool, V. K., Stoffman, N., and Yonker, S. E. (2015). The People in Your Neighborhood: Social
Interactions and Mutual Fund Portfolios. Journal of Finance, 70(6):2679–2732.
Portes, R. and Rey, H. (2005). The determinants of cross-border equity flows. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 65(2):269–296.
Rossi, A. G., Blake, D., Timmermann, A., Tonks, I., and Wermers, R. (2018). Network centrality
and delegated investment performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 128(1):183–206.
28
Sensoy, B. A., Wang, Y., and Weisbach, M. S. (2014). Limited partner performance and the maturing
of the private equity industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 112(3):320–343.
Sharpe, W. (1981). Decentralized Investment Management. The Journal of Finance, 36(2):217–234.
Sørensen, B. E., Wu, Y. T., Yosha, O., and Zhu, Y. (2007). Home bias and international risk sharing:
Twin puzzles separated at birth. Journal of International Money and Finance, 26(4):587–605.
Van Binsbergen, J. H., Brandt, M. W., and Koijen, R. S. (2008). Optimal decentralized investment
management. Journal of Finance, 63(4):1849–1895.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal
of Financial Economics, 40(2):185–211.
29
Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Average number of managers employed by university endowments for 1978-2008
Figure 2: Average number of managers employed by asset class
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Figure 3: Number of managers hired by multiple endowments (5-year rolling windows)
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Table 1: External Investment Manager Variables reported by NACUBO
This table reports the variables included in the Investment Managers sections of the NACUBO
reports. "Geography" reveals whether the external manager mandate is U.S. (Domestic),
International or Foreign. "Type" represents categories such as large cap or small cap for public
equities, hedge funds or private equity for alternative investments. "Style" represents asset
categories such as growth or value for equities, short or long-term for fixed income, etc. Last, the
"percentage of pool" represents the percentage of the endowment fund delegated to each manager.
Year Manager Name Asset Class Type Style Geography % of pool
1977 Yes - - - - -
1978-1987 Yes Yes - - - -
1988-1994 Yes Yes - - Yes -
1995-2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes
2002-2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2006-2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Table 2: University Endowment Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for all university endowments in the sample, for the period
1978-2008. The summary statistics reported are the number of universities included in the dataset
each year, the market value (MV) of the average endowment in the sample (measured in thousand
dollars), the average age (measured in years), the percentage of the universities that belong to the
Doctoral Carnegie Classification (offer PhD degrees), and the average full-time equivalent (FTE)
students.
Year Number ofUniversities
MV Average
($000s)
Age
Average
% Doctoral
Class.
FTE students
Average
1978 110 66,810
1980 142 76,887
1985 258 100,844 129 31% 8,805
1990 343 153,958 126 21% 4,517
1995 436 218,334 124 17% 5,532
2000 509 264,575 122 28% 8,548
2005 702 250,053 119 23% 7,448
2008 722 292,180 118 21% 9,245
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Table 3: Asset Allocation of University Endowments
This table reports the average percentage delegated by endowments to external managers in the
four main asset classes, as well as the average percentage managed internally. Equity and Fixed
Income include both domestic and international mandates, and alternative assets inlcude private
equity (buyouts and venture capital) and hedge funds. The percentages are reported for all years
they are available in NACUBO (1995-2005).
Year Equity FixedIncome
Alternative
Assets Cash
Internally
Managed
1995 47.3% 24.5% 0.0% 3.1% 9.4%
1996 49.5% 19.8% 0.0% 2.6% 6.5%
1997 58.3% 21.0% 0.0% 2.4% 6.7%
1998 56.0% 21.3% 0.0% 2.3% 5.8%
1999 56.5% 21.4% 0.0% 2.2% 4.9%
2000 55.5% 20.2% 0.0% 2.8% 5.3%
2001 55.1% 21.9% 0.0% 3.0% 4.3%
2002 56.9% 26.8% 7.4% 5.4% 3.1%
2003 57.0% 25.6% 8.6% 5.4% 2.5%
2004 59.9% 22.0% 9.6% 5.2% 5.9%
2005 58.1% 21.4% 11.7% 4.7% 5.1%
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Table 4: Local bias in Manager Selection by University Endowments
This table tests for local bias in endowment manager selection. The columns report the average
distance of endowments (in miles) from the equity managers that they employ (Endw. Man. Avg.
Distance) and the equity managers in their benchmark (Bench. Man. Avg. Distance), as well as
the differences of the distances and their significance for every year through 1992-2008. The
geographic location distances are calculated through the haversine formula which determines the
great-circle distance between two points on a sphere given their longitudes and latitudes.
T-statistics and p-values of the test that the average distance of the managers employed by the
endowment is different than the average distance of the managers in its benchmark are reported in
the last two columns.
Year Endw. Man.Avg. Distance
Bench. Man.
Avg. Distance
Difference
(miles) t-statistic p-value
1992 1,315 1,578 262 1.82 0.04
1993 1,213 1,542 328 2.73 0.00
1994 1,263 1,549 286 2.66 0.00
1995 1,214 1,556 342 3.65 0.00
1996 1,120 1,551 431 5.17 0.00
1997 1,173 1,566 392 4.74 0.00
1998 1,232 1,574 342 4.28 0.00
1999 1,257 1,580 323 3.96 0.00
2000 1,451 1,640 188 2.45 0.01
2001 1,486 1,633 147 2.14 0.02
2002 1,487 1,619 132 2.10 0.02
2003 1,491 1,603 113 2.01 0.02
2004 1,490 1,620 131 2.35 0.01
2005 1,483 1,620 137 2.58 0.00
2006 1,488 1,645 157 3.18 0.00
2007 1,524 1,647 122 2.40 0.01
2008 1,578 1,665 87 1.64 0.05
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Table 5: Commonality Variables Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for manager commonality for 1984, 1997 and 2008. It lists
the number of common managers between pairs of endowments as well as the percentage of their
manager commonality. The manager commonality is measured as the number of common
managers between each pair of endowments scaled by the sum of unique managers employed by
the pair. Eq-FI are the equity and fixed income managers, Alt-RE are the alternative assets and
real estate managers.
Variable Statistic 1984Eq-FI
1997
Eq-FI
1997
Alt-RE
2008
Eq-FI
2008
Alt-RE
Number of common managers Mean 0.04 0.31 0.09 0.37 0.19
Std. Dev. 0.22 0.55 0.31 0.69 0.58
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 3.00 5.00 7.00 9.00 20.00
Proportion of manager commonality Mean 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Std. Dev. 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.75 0.67
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Table 6: Determinants of Manager Commonality Between Endowments
This table reports results from a regression of the proportion of manager commonality measure
(number of common managers per pair of endowments scaled by the total number of unique
managers employed by the pair) on the differences in characteristics of the endowments and their
respective universities. The results are reported at three points in time, namely 1984, 1997 and
2008. The market value and total assets of the endowment are measured in billions, the age is
measured in years and is scaled by a factor of 100, and the distance is measured in miles and is
scaled by a factor of 100,000. The Status Distance represents a variable of the Carnegie
Classification (degree levels that universities offer) difference between each endowment pair. The
yearly regressions include endowment fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Scaled Number of Common Managers
1984 1997 2008
(1) (2) (3)
Market Value Distance −0.005 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.0003)
Age Distance 0.0004 0.002∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0004)
Geographic Distance −0.036∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001)
Status Distance −0.0003 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Constant 0.005 0.009 0.003
(0.042) (0.055) (0.039)
Endw FE? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,729 20,194 80,402
R2 0.051 0.194 0.144
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.183 0.138
Residual Std. Error 0.042 0.055 0.039
F Statistic 1.687∗∗∗ 17.986∗∗∗ 25.252∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7: Peer Effects in the Frequency of Hiring and Firing of External Managers
This table reports the hiring and firing peer effects for peer institutions as reported by the
institutions themselves (Chronicle of Higher Education data). Columns 1-4 estimate Poisson
regressions of the count variable (number of hirings and firings). Columns 1 and 2 regress the
number of hirings/firings on a Dummy that is 1 if peers hired/fired more than all the endowments
in the previours period and 0 otherwise. Columns 3 and 4 regress the number of hirings/firings on
the previous year’s average of hirings/firings by peer institutions. The Market Value is measured in
thousand dollars, Age in years, and lag(Return) is the previous year’s return. The regressions are
for years 1984-2008, include year and endowment fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by
time.
Dependent variable:
Numb. Hired Numb. Fired Numb. Hired Numb. Fired
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer Hiring D 0.1055∗∗∗
(0.0245)
Peer Firing D 0.0571∗∗
(0.0253)
Peer Hiring Average 0.0118∗∗∗
(0.0043)
Peer Firing Average 0.0332∗∗∗
(0.0071)
Change in Market Value −0.0614∗∗∗ 0.0019 −0.0618∗∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0093) (0.0054) (0.0093) (0.0053)
log(Age) 0.6642 1.1744∗∗ 0.6605 1.1372∗∗
(0.4440) (0.5574) (0.4443) (0.5565)
lag(Return) −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0044∗ −0.0048∗∗ −0.0045∗
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0024)
Constant −3.3505∗ −5.9862∗∗ −3.3359∗ −5.7948∗∗
(1.9759) (2.4810) (1.9772) (2.4772)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Endw FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,117 5,117 5,117 5,117
Log Likelihood −11,643.1800 −10,235.4600 −11,648.7900 −10,227.2600
Akaike Inf. Crit. 24,320.3500 21,504.9200 24,331.5800 21,488.5200
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8: Determinants of the Response Time of Endowments in Hiring and Firing External Managers
This table reports the results of a survival analysis of the number of years that elapse between two
endowments hiring the same manager. The specification is an Accelerated Failure Time model,
following the log-logistic distribution. The market value and total assets are measured in billions,
the age is measured in years and is scaled by a factor of 100 and the distance is measured in miles
and is scaled by a factor of 1,000. The estimation period for the regressions is 1979-2008, and the
specifications include year fixed effects (for the year that the second endowment hires or fires the
common manager). Standard errors are clustered by time.
Dependent variable:
Years Elapsed Years Elapsed
Hirings Firings
(1) (2)
Market Value Distance 0.017∗∗∗ 0.0003
(0.002) (0.004)
Age Distance 0.013∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.006) (0.009)
Geographic Distance 0.152∗∗∗ 0.074
(0.034) (0.048)
Total Assets Distance 0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00004∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Status Distance 0.006∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.904∗∗∗ 6.199∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.014)
Year FE? Yes Yes
Observations 138,904 71,304
Log Likelihood −323,010 −164,690
χ2 447∗∗∗ 4,099∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix
A. Data Classifications
Investment Manager Reporting
Most universities that participate in the NACUBO study report their external investment man-
agers in the “Investment Managers” section of the NACUBO report. I can identify a university as 
choosing not to report its investment managers when I can find market values reported in the same 
report, but I do not find the university in the “Investment Managers” section of the same report.
Table A.1 calculates the percentage of universities (from the ones that report in NACUBO), 
that also report in the “Investment Managers” section. Throughout the sample, the majority of 
the universities per year report in this section (the total reporting percentage every year ranges 
from 81% to 98%). This observation is consistent throughout the years of my sample as well as the 
different market value categories. The only category with relatively low percentage reporting was 
the one with the highest market value (more than $1 bil) during the early 2000s for three years.
Asset Class Transformations
I classify each asset class under a broader category according to Table A.2.
Market Value Categories
I source endowment market values from NACUBO - universities participating in the annual sur-
veys contribute the size of their endowment assets. This enables me to use the Market Values section 
of the endowment study as an indication of which endowments choose to report their managers. I 
assume that endowments that report market values but do not appear in the Investment Managers 
section of the report do not disclose their managers.
I classify the universities into size categories: small, medium and large. These categories are 
dynamically adjusted every decade according to the classifications provided by the NACUBO report 
of the corresponding year. I end up with the following classifications after combining the NACUBO 
categories:
"Small" classification: < 10 million (1977-1986), <10 million and 10-25 million (1987-1996), <25
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Figure A.1: Average number of managers employed by endowment size
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million (1997-2006), <25 and 25-50 million (2007-2008).
"Medium" classification: 10-50 million (1977-1986), 25-50 and 50-100 million (1987-1996), 25-100
and 100-400 million (1997-2006), 50-100 and 100-500 million (2007-2008).
"Large" classification: >50 million (1977-1986), 100-200 and >200 million (1987-1996), >400
million (1997-2006), 500 million - 1 billion and >1 billion (2007-2008).
Table A.1: Percentage of endowments that report in the NACUBO Investment Managers Section
This table calculates the percentage of endowments that report investment managers in the
Investment Managers section of the NACUBO reports. I identify an endowment as reporting in
general in the NACUBO report if it reports its market value. I identify an endowment as not
reporting in the Investment Managers section if it reports its market value but not its external
managers.
Year Fraction Reporting >1 bil ($) 500 m -1 bil ($)
100 m -
500 m ($) <100 m ($)
1988 0.85 0.80 1.00 0.93 0.82
1993 0.92 0.69 0.79 0.95 0.93
1994 0.95 0.88 1.00 0.95 0.95
1995 0.95 0.82 0.90 0.98 0.95
1996 0.90 0.75 0.93 0.90 0.91
1997 0.93 0.88 0.89 0.94 0.93
1998 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.95 0.93
1999 0.81 0.62 0.81 0.83 0.83
2000 0.89 0.55 0.87 0.94 0.91
2001 0.95 0.66 0.96 0.96 0.98
2002 0.96 0.85 0.93 0.97 0.98
2003 0.96 0.82 0.94 0.97 0.97
2004 0.96 0.83 0.96 0.96 0.98
2005 0.97 0.82 0.98 0.97 0.99
2006 0.97 0.82 0.98 0.97 1.00
2007 0.98 0.91 0.98 0.98 1.00
2008 0.96 0.84 0.92 0.97 0.98
41
Table A.2: Asset Class Transformations
This table reports the asset allocation re-classifications of the data, to ease the matching of the
data. Since asset classes are reported differently throughout the sample, I re-classify each asset
class into a broader asset category to keep the sample uniform and be able to identify hirings and
firings accurately.
Asset Class Transformation
Absolute Return Alternative Assets
Alternative Assets Alternative Assets
Arbitrage Alternative Assets
Balanced Balanced
Buyouts Alternative Assets
Cash Cash and Other Investments
Cash and Other Investments Cash and Other Investments
Commodities Alternative Assets
Distressed Obligations Alternative Assets
Distressed Securities Alternative Assets
Equity Equity
Equity Real Estate Real Estate
Event Arbitrage Alternative Assets
Faculty Mortgages Cash and Other Investments
Fixed Income Fixed Income
Fixed Income High-Yield Fixed Income
Foreign Equity Equity
Foreign Fixed Income Fixed Income
Hedge Funds Alternative Assets
Leveraged Buyouts Alternative Assets
Managed Futures Alternative Assets
Non-Venture Private Equity Alternative Assets
Oil & Gas Alternative Assets
Other Other
Private Equity Alternative Assets
Real Estate Real Estate
Real Estate - Equity Real Estate
Real Estate - Mortgage Real Estate
Short-Term Cash and Other Investments
Timber Alternative Assets
Various
Venture Capital Alternative Assets
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Table A.3: Determinants of Manager Commonality - Asset Class Breakdown
This table reports results from a regression of the manager commonality measure on differences in
characteristics of the endowments/universities. The proportion of manager commonality measure
is defined as the number of common managers per pair of endowments scaled by the total number
of unique managers employed by the pair. The results are reported for the equity/fixed income
asset classes and for the alternative assets/real estate asset classes separately. The results are
reported at three points in time, namely 1984, 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is the
manager commonality measure and the independent variables are the differences in characteristics
of the endowments and corresponding universities. The market value and total assets are measured
in billions, the age is scaled by a factor of 100 and the distance in miles is scaled by a factor of
100,000. The Status Distance represents a variable of the Carnegie Classification difference
between the pair. The regressions include endowment fixed effects.
Dependent variable:
Proportion of Manager Commonality
1984-EqFI 1997-EqFI 2008-EqFI 1997-AltRE 2008-AltRE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market Value Distance −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Age Distance −0.001 0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Geographic Distance −0.039∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.006∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.017) (0.003)
Status Distance −0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant 0.012∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Endw FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,497 35,503 146,596 10,009 100,117
Adjusted R2 0.0048 0.0043 0.0010 0.0121 0.0022
Residual Std. Error 0.041 0.066 0.055 0.119 0.065
F Statistic 9.98∗∗∗ 39.70∗∗∗ 38.34∗∗∗ 31.64∗∗∗ 57.42∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.4: Determinants of Manager Commonality - Ranks
This table reports robustness checks for the regression of the manager commonality measure on 
differences in characteristics of the endowments/universities. The proportion of manager 
commonality measure is defined as the number of common managers per pair of endowments scaled 
by the total number of unique managers employed by the pair. The results are reported at three 
points in time, namely 1984, 1997 and 1997. The dependent variable is the manager commonality 
measure and the independent variables are the differences in characteristics of the endowments and 
universities. The dependent variables are the absolute values of the differences in endowment 
characteristics such as market value (measured in $US billions - percentile rank), age (measured in 
years - percentile rank), geographic distance (measured in miles). The Status Distance is the 
Carnegie Classification (types of degrees the university offers) distance between the pair. The 
regressions include endowment fixed effects and standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Proportion of Manager Commonality
1984 1997 2008
(1) (2) (3)
Market Value Distance (Ranks) −0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0161∗∗∗ −0.0200∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0005)
Age Distance (Ranks) −0.0063∗∗ −0.0022 0.0010∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0005)
Geographic Distance −0.4325∗∗∗ −0.1209∗∗ −0.0831∗∗∗
(0.1009) (0.0573) (0.0216)
Status Distance 0.0000 −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0051
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0211)
Constant 0.0067 0.0071 0.0175
(0.0407) (0.0550) (0.0213)
Endw FE? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,497 37,939 170,219
R2 0.0415 0.1852 0.1303
Adjusted R2 0.0260 0.1794 0.1273
Residual Std. Error 0.0407 0.0550 0.0422
F Statistic 2.6821∗∗∗ 31.9582∗∗∗ 44.5718∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2. Network Connections in Private Equity Investments
of University Endowments
Abstract
In a social network setting, this paper examines how endowments and Private Equity (PE)
managers gain access to each other through their institutional and personal connections. Buyout
(BO) and Venture Capital (VC) investment networks are examined separately. Using data from
1988 to 2008, I identify the characteristics of the centrally located endowments and managers in
the network. While VC networks were more developed at the beginning of the sample than their
BO counterparts in terms of number of players and connections between them, both networks
have grown denser over time. However, the identity of their key institutions (central endowments
and managers) has stayed the same throughout the period examined. Centrally located man-
agers have better investment returns and win new endowment mandates in subsequent periods.
Personal connections between individuals working at endowments and PE firms also play an
important role in manager selection by endowments.
Keywords: Endowments, Networks, Private Equity, Buyouts, Venture Capital
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1 Introduction
University endowments are a class of institutional investors with a very long-term investment horizon. 
In the recent past, endowments have shifted their investment portfolios away from “traditional” 
investments in public equities and bonds, in favor of “alternative” assets such as private equity 
(PE) and hedge funds. This investment style, called the “US endowment model” or “Yale 
model” (as David Swensen developed it at Yale University) has been copied by many university 
endowments and other institutional investors since the 1980s.
The rising importance of PE investments for endowments can be attributed to several factors. 
Such investments allow endowments to exploit their long-term horizon and flexible spending needs 
to harvest the illiquidity premia of private assets, or to identify and gain access to outperforming 
managers given that private equity markets are less efficient than public markets (Swensen (2009)). 
PE investments could be particularly crucial for endowments, which are large institutions with an 
excellent reputation and alumni networks, as their connections could provide them with easier access 
to top-performing managers than other types of investors (Lerner et al. (2008)).
During the past few decades, endowments and other plan sponsors have shifted towards a “de-
centralized” norm in delegated portfolio management.1 Plan sponsors such as endowments allocate 
mandates (including PE) to various external investment management firms. This creates a complex 
network of connections between managers who each oversee a portion of the investment portfolio of 
an endowment, and between endowments employing the same investment managers. Such a network 
allows the potential for interactions between institutions.
My paper brings evidence of the importance of networks in asset management. Exploiting a 
unique database that contains a long time-series and cross-section, I examine the connectedness 
between university endowments and PE firms. I split investments into Buyout (BO) and Venture 
Capital (VC) networks and examine them separately to see whether BO or VC networks behave 
differently. This might be the case as VC is generally viewed as being dominated by the top-
performing firms and because of previous research on VC networks (see Hochberg et al. (2007) and 
Hochberg et al. (2010)). Therefore, I hypothesize that VC firms are not going to connect with BO 
firms either directly or indirectly via an endowment. I explore the structure of relationships in the
1Blake et al. (2013) investigate the shift towards decentralized investment management for pension funds.
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endowment-manager network and its evolution over time, and the determinants of central network
positioning for endowments and PE firms. I also hypothesize that central location of PE firms
(which represents exposure to centrally-located endowments), benefits their investment returns and
asset growth in terms of winning new endowment mandates. Last, I investigate social networks of
individuals working in investment management (endowment trustees and PE portfolio managers)
and examine whether personal connections mapped through education or common past employment
play a role in PE investment selection by endowments.
Previous work has shown that endowments, especially those of the Ivy League educational in-
stitutions, possess superior investment selection ability, especially in PE. According to Lerner et al.
(2008), top endowments might have superior ability to select and access managers, as higher endow-
ment returns accompanied the shift towards alternative investments. However, the literature has not
been able to pinpoint the channel through which endowments make successful investments, although
qualitative evidence has suggested that they benefit from the superior choices of their investment
committees (Lerner et al. (2008)). Regarding their manager selection for private investments, Yale
states in their 2018 endowment report that:
Yale’s venture capital program, one of the first of its kind, is regarded as among the
best in the institutional investment community; the University is frequently cited as a
role model by other investors. [...] The University’s venture capital portfolio contains an
unparalleled set of manager relationships, significant market knowledge, and an extensive
network.
My paper uses network analysis and graph theory to study the external PE manager appointments
of university endowments over the course of 20 years, 1988-2008.2 One prior study of managers and
plan sponsors in public equities has suggested that central positioning in a network helps managers
receive information about their competitors, which leads to better investment performance (Rossi
et al. (2018)). My paper uses U.S. data on endowments and their external PE managers to explore
a similar question. This research question is of particular interest as PE investments, due to their
nature of being executed in private markets, are less easily replicated and more likely to arise through
network connections between firms or individuals than investments in public markets.
2The dataset stops in 2008 due to the ceasing of manager reporting after this date. Please refer to Section 3 of
the paper for further details.
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I identify network connections for endowments and their investment managers in the data in
three different ways. First, each endowment connects with an external PE (BO or VC) manager
whenever it gives them a portion of their assets to manage. Second, each PE firm manages only
a portion of an endowment’s overall assets, with sometimes many other firms managing the rest
of the portfolio. I therefore map a network between PE managers which each oversee a portion
of the same endowment. For example, if a BO Manager A manages a portion of the portfolio for
an endowment client who has also hired Manager B, this creates a manager-to-manager connection
between Managers A and B. Third, I connect endowments which hire the same PE manager for
their respective funds. For example, if a BO firm manages a portion of endowments 1 and 2, this
creates a connection between endowments 1 and 2. These measures of network connectedness help
illustrate different aspects of the importance of each individual in the network.
My data allows several findings. First, I confirm the already established shift of endowment port-
folios towards PE investments, both in terms of portfolio asset allocation and number of investment
managers used for PE. I then identify a network of connections for each endowment and manager.
I find that endowment centrality relates positively to the market value of the endowment, age and
size of the student body of the university, especially for VC networks. Manager centrality relates
negatively to measures of asset size of PE managers as well as the manager’s age. This suggests
that the smaller and younger managers are getting hired by the most well-connected endowments.
With regards to the network structure, VC networks were more developed than their BO counter-
parts at the beginning of the sample (more players and more connections). However, both networks
have grown denser over time and their key institutions (central endowments and managers) have
stayed the same throughout the period examined. In particular, large endowments, supporting old
universities with many students tend to stay in a central network location for a prolonged time.
Second, a central network position of PE managers is related to better investment performance
and more subsequent hirings by other university endowments. These results suggest that managers
can exploit their position to expand their client base and grow their assets.
Third, professional and educational connections of individuals working in investment manage-
ment matter for manager selection in private markets. Endowments are more likely to allocate funds
to PE managers if their employees/partners went to the same school the endowment supports, or
if they have worked in the investment management function of the endowment in the past. This
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result is consistent with endowments exploiting their superior alumni networks and their top profile 
to gain access to private investments. This finding expands Binfare et al. (2018), who conclude 
that expertise in alternatives and larger professional networks are associated with higher allocations 
to alternatives and better investment results. My paper looks at specific investments in private 
markets, and how connections between individuals affects their selection.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature of networks, university 
endowments and PE firms. Section 3 describes the data sources and matching procedure. Section 
4 describes the network identification, computes various network measures and examines their evo-
lution. Section 5 investigates endowment and manager centrality measures, their persistence and 
their influence over subsequent PE manager hirings. Section 6 maps network connections between 
individuals and examines their role in PE manager selection, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This study contributes to the literature on social networks, delegated portfolio management, private 
equity investing, and endowments.
The prior literature conjectures that information diffusion through social networks affects in-
vestor trading behavior, returns, and corporate governance. There are various channels through 
social network connections could manifest. These channels can relate to information exchange and 
reduction of asymmetric information, enhanced sense of trust for specific individuals and companies, 
as well as lack of attention that leads to limited choice sets.
A number of studies present empirical evidence that social networks play an important role in 
explaining investors’ trading decisions and portfolio returns. Studying information diffusion, Pareek 
(2009) presents evidence of information linkages between funds with large positions in the same 
stocks, while Rossi et al. (2018) suggest that network centrality of external equity managers of 
UK pension plans is positively related to risk-adjusted performance and growth in assets under 
management.3 Buraschi and Porchia (2012) find that central firms, with the ability to transfer 
a distress state to other firms’ fundamentals, have higher expected stock returns, while Ozsoylev 
et al. (2014) add that central investors in terms of information signals trade earlier than peripheral
3Other papers on information transfers in the financial markets are Bursztyn et al. (2014) and Garmaise and
Moskowitz (2003).
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investors. Hong et al. (2004) suggest that measures of sociability relate to increased stock market
participation, and Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) show that investors are more likely to enter the stock
market after their neighbors have enjoyed above average portfolio returns. In bond markets, Li and
Schürhoff (2019) find that dealers in the over-the-counter municipal market form trading networks
with other dealers to mitigate search frictions. Network effects are also industry-wide. Ahern (2013)
examines networks of intersectoral trades and finds that stocks in central industries, on average,
earn higher returns than stocks in more peripheral industries.
Studying trust and personal connections in corporate boards and governance, Cohen et al. (2008)
find that mutual fund managers place larger individual stock bets and generate significantly better
performance if their managers are connected with their board members. Kuhnen (2009) finds that
directors tend to hire advisory firms they have worked with in the past, while Nguyen (2012) finds
that a CEO well-connected with the board of directors is less easily fired after bad performance and
is more likely to find a good job later. Bouwman (2011) examines how network effects of directors
serving in multiple companies with different governance practices, cause these practices to eventually
converge, and Gaspar and Massa (2011) find that personal connections between divisional managers
and the CEO increase the bargaining power of the connected managers and decrease the efficiency
of decisions within the organization. My study follows a different approach to all the foregoing
in seeking to identify network connections arriving from the selection of external PE managers by
university endowments, in a delegated investment management setting.
Social networks have also gained increased attention in recent studies in economics. There exists
expanding literature exploring contagion and cascades especially in the banking sector, and relating
institutional networks to issues such as liquidity, defaults and foreign debt holdings (Elliott et al.
(2014); Cabrales et al. (2017); Kobayashi and Takaguchi (2018)). Acemoglu et al. (2015) discusses
the relationship between the interbank network density and financial stability, and finds that density
can enhance financial stability when shocks are small, but can lead to the propagation of large shocks
and a more fragile financial system. Moreover, Brunetti et al. (2019) study the interconnectedness
of the bank network before and after the financial crisis. These studies suggest that the density and
structure of institutional networks are essential for the stability of the banking market.
In the alternative investments space, Hochberg et al. (2007) look at networks of venture capital
firms through syndicated investments and find that better-networked firms experience significantly
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better performance (IPO exits). Moreover, Hochberg et al. (2010) show that incumbent venture 
capital firms use their networks to restrict the entry of new firms, thereby strengthening their 
bargaining power over entrepreneurs. In a setting similar to this paper’s, Bhagwat (2013) finds 
that two given VC firms are three times more likely to syndicate an investment if their managers 
overlapped at an educational institution, and their subsequent investments are associated with better 
investment outcomes. The prior literature has also studied the evolution of the PE investment space 
and has discovered patterns pointing to a maturing of the industry. PE returns have changed since the 
1990s (see Robinson and Sensoy (2013); Harris et al. (2014)). Venture capital performance has 
declined substantially, both in absolute terms and relative to public markets, while buyout 
performance has been less affected. Moreover, despite the fact that PE performance has been highly 
cyclical (periods of high fundraising have been followed by periods of low performance), Brown et al.
(2019) show that investor timing strategies in terms of their capital commitments do not produce 
substantial gains.
My paper also relates to the literature of delegated investment management as it explores the 
outsourcing of endowment funds to PE firms. Delegating the investment management of funds has 
long been established as a feature of plan sponsor behavior (Blake et al. (2013); Rossi et al. (2018)). A 
similar concept, subadvising funds, is also common in the mutual funds industry (see Debaere and 
Evans (2014); Chuprinin et al. (2015)). However, studying the delegated investment management of 
plan sponsors has been difficult due to the lack of data about the investments of these institutions. For 
this reason, the previous literature has focused on UK funds. My paper uses a hand-collected dataset 
of PE firms that manage funds for university endowments, which allows me to gain insights about 
delegated investment management of institutions with long horizons in private markets.
Last, this paper relates closely to the literature on investment strategies of university endow-
ments. David Swensen (2009), the head of the Yale University endowment and a very successful 
investor in PE, has argued that endowments are better equipped to assess and evaluate investments 
with severe asymmetric information, such as alternative investments. It is often argued that early 
movers in the PE industry are at an advantage, with the Yale and Harvard University 
endowments often cited as examples (see Sensoy et al. (2014) and Swensen (2009)). The Yale 
endowment explicitly follows a policy of reinvesting in partnerships to maximize its access to future 
funds (Lerner and Leamon (2004)). Da Rin and Phalippou (2017) suggest that more 
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experienced investors may have learnt over time how to perform more effective due diligence, while 
Lerner et al. (2007) find that endowments substantially outperform other types of investors on their 
investments in funds raised between 1991 and 1998, especially in PE partnerships, due to improved 
access and experience in in-vesting. Binfare et al. (2018) suggest that endowments’ expertise in 
alternatives and their extensive professional networks are associated with higher allocations to 
alternatives and better investment results. On the other hand, Sensoy et al. (2014) find that the 
investment advantage of university endowments and their superior returns disappear after 2000 
mainly due to the maturation of the PE industry. After 2000, endowments’ investing behavior into 
VC is similarly successful than that of other institutions (Cavagnaro et al. (2019)). Studying the 
1991-2011 period, Barber and Wang (2013) conclude that university endowments on average do not 
exhibit any ability to beat high-level benchmarks through selection or timing skills and that “elite” 
institutions benefit from higher re-turns on alternative assets. The authors do not, however, develop 
specific measures of networks or expertise. This paper identifies networks through the selection by 
endowments of PE firms, and uses theses connections to study the manager selection process of 
institutions in private markets.
3 Data
My novel data set exploits data on PE (BO and VC) managers for U.S. university endowments 
from 1988-2008. The data is hand-collected from the “Investment Managers” section of the annual 
NACUBO reports.4 For each university endowment, I source the names of the investment man-
agement firms employed every year to manage mandates, as well as the types of mandates (BO or VC) 
and sub-mandates used (for example, Distressed Securities or Multi-Strategy). For example, 
Endowment A in 2000, employs PE Firm X to manage “Private Equity, Distressed Securities”. The 
data starts in 1988 as endowments did not report any investments in PE before this date, and the last 
year available in the dataset is 2008 as NACUBO’s practice of reporting endowment managers (for all 
asset mandates, including PE) stopped altogether that year.
I source data on the characteristics of the universities which own endowments from IPEDS.5 
4National Association of College and University Business Officers. NACUBO is an advocacy organization devoted
to improving management practices in the higher education industry.
5Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, data submitted to the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES), available since 1984.
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The data includes university-specific variables such as the name of the university, Zip Code, state, 
Carnegie Classification,  public or private university status,  age  since  the  university  was  founded, 
total university income, costs, assets and debt, tuition and appropriations, total applicants and 
applicants admitted, and full-time equivalent (FTE) students.6
Despite participating in the NACUBO surveys, not all university endowments report their exter-
nal investment managers in the “Investment Managers” section. Table A.2 in the Appendix reports 
the yearly percentage of institutions reporting their managers. I identify a university as not report-
ing managers if it reports its annual market value in the NACUBO report, but declines to respond 
to the “Investment Managers” section of the report. Universities managing their assets internally 
(for all or part of their mandates) tend to also indicate this in the “Investment Managers” section. 
Through the sample period, the proportion of universities reporting every year ranges from 81% to 
98%. There also seems to be no selection bias in terms of size of those endowments that disclose 
their managers.7
Tables 1 to 3 report summary statistics for the university endowments in my sample. The cross 
section of institutions is large, and ranges from around 260 institutions in the beginning of the sample 
to 722 universities at the end of the sample. About 30% of the universities belong to the “Doctoral” 
Carnegie   c lassification   (they   offer   PhD   degrees).  Table  2   shows   that  the  proportion  of  the  
endowments’ portfolios allocated to alternative assets has increased substantially over time, especially 
for the largest funds, at the expense of equity and bond investments. The average number of external 
managers selected for endowment portfolio mandates has more than tripled over the time period, 
which depicts the adoption of the delegated investment management practice. The number of PE 
managers has risen the most over my sample period, a trend which matches the increase of PE 
allocations in endowment portfolios.
The BO and VC manager data from NACUBO have undergone classification changes during the 
years of reporting. While the “Venture Capital” mandate has been reported consistently as such 
during the years available, the classification of Buyouts has changed from LBOs to PE. A detailed 
report of the different classifications of PE investments for each year can be found in Table A.1.
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6Providing information through IPEDS is mandatory for all U.S. post-secondary institutions, and institutions
failing to provide information are barred from accessing federal funding (Brown et al. (2012)).
7I am considering ways to expand the time-series component of the data. A possible route could be to gain access
to data on General Partners (GPs) and Limited Partners (LPs), and identify university endowments as some of their
LPs (for example, through Cambridge Associates). Expanding the time horizon of the study would also help examine
whether the global financial crisis changed the PE investing behavior of endowments. Acquiring a dataset of LP
investments resembling that of Cavagnaro et al. (2019) would be beneficial.
To identify cross-sectional and time-series characteristics of the PE firms hired by university 
endowments, I source data from Thomson Reuters and Preqin, available since 1988. I source char-
acteristics of firms such as their location, age, and the funds they raised over the sample period 
from Thomson Reuters. I obtain data on PE performance from Preqin. Preqin’s dataset provides 
fund-level measures of performance such as IRRs and multiples, as well as the assets under manage-
ment of the PE firms.8 The data provide an accurate match of more than 72% of the PE manager 
appointments in the NACUBO reports over 1988-2008. As seen in Table 4, the number of firms 
matched to Thomson Reuters ranges from 148 in the beginning of the period to 362 at the end of 
the period. Table 4 also presents some of the PE manager characteristics such as the year they were 
founded, and indicators of their size such as the average number of companies they invest in, their 
equity per company, as well as the firms’ latest fund sizes.
Additionally, to identify university trustees, I match Boardex North America data from 1988-2008 
to the university endowments in the sample. I define the trustees of the endowments as individuals 
whose role titles are related to the endowment’s investment management function (e.g. Trustee, 
CIO or CFO/Treasurer).9 I source the trustees’ education as well as their past employment and 
achievements through Boardex. About 75% of the universities in the sample can be matched to 
Boardex. The number of universities reporting individuals in the investment management functions 
of the endowment is 138 (23%) and the number of distinct individuals between 1988 and 2008 is 
225. The average appointment duration for a trustee of an endowment is 6.5 years, but this number
varies considerably. Individuals stay in position between a few months and 33 years. This variable 
is both left and right-censored since some trustee appointments start before 1988 and finish after 
2008. Finally, the universities reporting trustees through Boardex are almost double in asset size 
($800k) and in full-time students (7k), and more tilted towards the “Doctoral” Carnegie Classification 
category than the universities which do not report through Boardex.
8Most endowments in my sample do not report the exact fund they invest in, but rather the PE firm name.
Therefore, I create performance composites for each PE firm using all its available funds at a given point in time.
One concern might be that some PE firms have multiple funds with varying performance across them. In order to
mitigate this concern, I observe that the average number of funds that each PE firm has running in any given period
is around six, with the majority (60%) of PE firms having between one and four funds.
9Lerner et al. (2008) use a similar approach in identifying endowment staff as anyone whose title includes words
such as “investment,” “endowment,” or “asset,” or whose titles otherwise indicate direct involvement in endowment
management.
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I match the Boardex data with the BO firms to identify their portfolio managers. Boardex does
not include “Venture Capital” in their firm sectors. Therefore I only use BO firms for this part
of the analysis. I can match 60% of the names of BO firms hired by university endowments with
Boardex data. I source the characteristics of their portfolio managers such as their past education
and achievements, which I use to examine their social network connections with the universities
that employ them. Boardex also includes associations between companies based on common past
employment of their employees, which I also use to connect endowments and BO firms.
4 Network of Endowments, Buyout and Venture Capital Managers
For each endowment, a Board of Trustees specifies investment objectives, spending policies, and gives
responsibilities to the investment office which can choose to manage the funds itself (internally) or to
delegate management to external asset management firms. In the outsourcing regime, the investment
committee may delegate substantial discretion to a full-time staff including a Chief Investment
Officer (CIO) and a range of investment professionals (Binfare et al. (2018)). All endowments that
report in the “Investment Management” section of the NACUBO surveys in 2008 adopt the external
management approach (at least for part of their portfolio) and delegate mandates to investment
managers expecting them to deliver a certain level of performance.
Moreover, alternative asset strategies and investments into PE firms have become increasingly
crucial for endowments in the recent past. Table 3 examines the asset allocation of the university
endowments’ portfolios to investments such as PE. Endowments have gradually increased their
average asset allocation as well as the average number of managers they employ. The rest of the
paper focuses on endowments’ PE investments and analyses their specific manager appointments.
4.1 Network Identification and Connections
The extensive network of endowments and the firms they hire can be represented through a bipartite
network. I work with two types of agents: endowments and PE firms. The natural representation of
the overall (affiliation) network of this kind is a graph with two types of nodes (endowments and PE
firms) and edges connecting endowments with the PE firms they employ. In this bipartite graph,
nodes fall in two distinct sets and edges only make connections between the two sets. Figure 1 is a
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simplified example of such a graph for the year 2008 for five endowments and their respective BO
firms, where common BO firm appointments connect endowments. The endowments in Figure 1 are
Pomona College, Michigan State University, Albion College, University of Portland and University
of Illinois. In 2008, Pomona College and Michigan State University hired four common managers for
their BO investments, namely Bain Capital, Madison Dearborn, Cerberus Capital Management and
Blackstone. University of Portland and University of Illinois did not have any common managers
with the aforementioned universities, but shared Adams Street Partners for their PE investments.
Albion College only invested with Common Fund, which also was one of Michigan State University’s
managers.
I also project the network onto each of its two separate sets of vertices (endowments and man-
agers) to understand the relative prominence of nodes (institutions) in each projection of the network.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these projections for BO managers and endowments accordingly for 2008.
When endowments are the units of analysis, the nodes represent endowments and edges represent
shared managers. When PE managers are the units of analysis, the nodes represent managers and
edges represent shared endowment appointments. Figure 2 connects two BO firms, Drum Capital
Management and Alta Equity Partners. In 2008, these two BO firms were co-managing parts of
endowments’ portfolios with Common Fund. Figure 3 connects two universities, Yeshiva University
and Chapman University. Each of these universities is connected with other universities employing
the same BO managers, and they both have at least one common managers with Howard University
and the University of Iowa and Foundation. A similar network of affiliations could be created for
VC manager appointments of endowments.
I use all connections between endowments and PE firms each year to construct a time series.
Having illustrated a simple representation of the network connections in Figures 1 to 3, Figure 4
makes use of the full set of connections in the data to examine the evolution of the network over two
decades. Figure 4 plots the network connections illustrated in Figure 1 at years 1988, 1998, and 2008.
The grey squares represent university endowments, and the black circles represent PE firms. The
BO panel represents the network of endowments with BO firms, and the VC panel represents the
network of endowments and VC firms. The network of connections between endowments and their
managers has become significantly denser over time for both BO and VC investments. The density of
the network connections partly comes from the fact that, over time, a lot more endowments and PE
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firms have entered the network, creating connections between them. As previously mentioned, PE
investments have become a popular investment for university endowments in recent years. However,
another aspect of density comes from the fact that endowments over time become more connected
(either directly or indirectly) with PE managers. In order to make sure that the increased density
of the network does not come from a mechanical effect of having more players in the network, I
normalize the centrality measures to take into account the entry of more players and examine their
time series in a more formal setting in Table 6. Moreover, the VC network was denser than its BO
counterpart in the beginning of the sample as depicted in Panels A for 1988, but the BO network has
expanded to a great extent over time. As evident in Figure 4, while endowments did not appoint as
many BO managers at the beginning of the sample as in VC, the BO network seems to have caught
up to the VC counterpart by the end of the sample.
4.2 Network Centrality Measures
Network analysis aims to describe the structure of relationships among a set of actors (in my case,
institutions such as endowments and PE firms). An institution’s importance in the network is
measured by the "centrality" of its position, representing its involvement in relationships with others.
There are different ways to measure centrality, and each focuses on different dimensions of a
network. I consider three different measures, namely degree centrality, eigenvector centrality and
betweenness.
A. Degree Centrality
Degree centrality measures connectedness by counting the number of direct links each entity has to
others. This measure can reveal the level of activity in the network, as well as the most important
(active) institutions. For a specific institution (node) in the network, degree centrality is the path
through which information flows (Rossi et al. (2018)). The degree centrality of a node i at time t,
DEit, is defined as
DEit =
dit
Nt − 1 (1)
where dit is the number of connected neighbors for the node i at time tand Nt is the total number
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of nodes in the network at time t. By definition, degree centrality depends on the size of the network,
as more extensive networks have a higher number of connected actors. In my setting, the network
of endowments and managers has evolved over time both in size and in composition. To compare
degree centralities over time, I normalize them by the number of nodes in the network (maximum
number of ties possible).
B. Closeness - Eigenvector centrality
While degree counts the number of relationships an actor has, closeness takes into account their
“quality”. Measures of closeness focus on the proximity of an actor to other actors in the network.
An actor with high closeness centrality has the shortest paths to other actors which allows them to
receive and distribute information quicker than others.
A particularly useful measure of closeness is “eigenvector centrality”. The eigenvector is a
weighted degree centrality in which each connection of a given node is weighted by the respec-
tive centrality score of that connection. Let A be the adjacency matrix of the network graph, λ
be the largest eigenvalue of A and x be the corresponding eigenvector (Ax = λx). Then, the ith
component of the eigenvector x gives the eigenvector centrality score of the ith node in the network.
The eigenvector centrality of the ith node is proportional to the sum of centralities of i’s neighbors
(j) and is defined as
x =
1
λ
Ax → xi = 1
λ
N∑
j=1
Ai,jxj (2)
Therefore, an endowment or manager with a high eigenvector score is likely to be at the center
of a cluster of key actors that themselves have high eigenvector scores. This actor can communicate
directly with those key entities compared with an actor with a low eigenvector score on the periphery
of the network.
C. Betweenness
Betweenness centrality captures how important a node is in connecting other nodes, so it identifies
entities with the ability to control information flow throughout the network (gatekeeper entities).
Betweenness measures the number of shortest paths connecting different nodes passing through each
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node. The betweenness of node i at time t, BEit, is defined as
BEit =
∑
k 6=j;i6=k;i6=j
Pi(k,j)
P (k,j)
(Nt − 1)(Nt − 2)/2 (3)
where Pj (k, j) is the number of shortest paths between k and j that pass through i, and P (k, j) is 
the number of shortest paths between k and j.
     A higher  value  of  betweenness  suggests  a  more  central  network  positioning  (more paths). For 
example, a node with high betweenness has many paths running through it, allowing it to transfer 
information to the rest of the network. However, even if a node has very few paths running through 
it, it might still play an important role if it is positioned between different network clusters.
Each of these measures capture a different aspect of the network and help understand its different 
dimensions. Degree centrality depends on having many connections, while eigenvector centrality 
weighs these connections with respect to how isolated they are. For eigenvector centrality, a central 
node should be one connected to other powerful nodes. Betweenness centrality calculates how many 
pairs of individuals would have to go through one node in order to reach one another in the minimum 
number of stops. Therefore, it monitors the ability of a node to control information in the network.
Table 5 reports the distribution of the network centrality measures (degree, betweenness, eigen-
vector centrality) for endowments and PE firms for 2008. Panels A and B report summary statistics 
for BO networks, and Panels C and D for VC networks. Over time, there is a discernible rise in the 
average centrality measures of both endowments and managers. Most notably, in the beginning of 
the period, managers in the VC network appear more connected than their BO counterparts. How-
ever, BO manager connections have risen considerably, more than those of VC managers (Panels 
B and D). This is accordance with Figure 4 and corresponds to the rise of the popularity in BO 
investments by endowments. The average betweenness centrality varies considerably over time as 
more players (nodes) being present in the network means that there is a larger number of paths 
connecting any pairs of nodes.10 However, across time, there exist players that are very central 
(high maximum centralities) and ones that are very peripheral and disconnected from the rest of 
the network (zero centralities).
10Note that betweenness measures the number of shortest paths that connect two nodes that pass through a specific
node
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4.3 Network Evolution
Figure 4 suggested that the network of endowments and their managers has become substantially
denser over time. To formally examine the network’s evolution, I study the time-series of its average
centrality measures. I examine a snapshot of the BO and VC network each year, and standardize
each centrality measure by subtracting its time-series average and dividing by its standard deviation
over the full sample. The standardized centrality measure for every year is constructed as follows,
and has mean zero and unit variance (similar to Rossi et al. (2018)):
S NetCentt =
NetCentt −mean(NetCentt)
stdev(NetCentt)
(4)
I calculate the time-series averages for the one-mode representations of the networks (for endow-
ments and managers). Table 6 presents the time series of the average normalized centrality measures
for endowments and managers from 1988 to 2008. The similar upward trend of the standardized
centrality measures (degree, betweenness, eigenvector centrality) suggests that centrality measures
for endowments and managers have increased over time, and share common components. Rossi et al.
(2018) find a similar pattern for UK equities.
5 Network Positioning and Effects
This section investigates the positioning of institutions (PE firms and endowments) in the network,
and identifies the key players and their persistence. It also examines whether the network positioning
of BO and VC firms relates to the probability of getting new mandates from endowments in the
future, as well as their investment performance.
5.1 Determinants of Centrality Measures
Centrality measures for endowments and managers depict how important each institution is in
the network of associations. Tables 7 and 8 examine the relationship between endowments’ and
managers’ characteristics and centrality measures in a panel setting. I normalize each of the net-
work centrality measures for endowment or manager j by scaling it by the cross-sectional average
(NETjt/NETt), in order to account for time series trends in the overall network structure.
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Table 7 presents the results for endowments. Panel A examines the centrality of endowments 
in BO networks, while Panel B in VC networks. Regressions (2)-(4) present results for three net-
work centrality measures of interest, namely degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality, while 
Regression (1) for an equally-weighted average of all the normalized centrality measures. Panel B 
suggests that older endowments with higher market values and more Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) 
students tend to be critical in the network of connections for the VC network. However, there is 
no consistent endowment characteristic that determines the importance of endowments in the BO 
network, as depicted in Panel A.
Table 8 performs the same analysis for BO and VC managers and the regressions have similar 
coefficient interpretations. Panel A examines the centrality of BO managers, while Panel B that 
of VC managers. Centrality measures for managers in both BO and VC networks relate negatively 
to measures of the manager’s age, while the manager’s size also seems to be important for the 
VC networks. This suggests that the smaller and younger managers tend to get picked by the 
most well-connected endowments. This result supports the popular belief that some endowments 
(and especially the large, prestigious ones) have the capacity to invest in a variety of funds and 
oftentimes pick idiosyncratic, young managers with which they form investment relationships from 
an early stage. This effect is stronger for the VC managers (Panel B).
5.2 Persistence of Centrality Measures
I track the evolution of the individual centrality measures for endowments and managers over time. 
Following Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2010), I use a nonpara-
metric methodology based upon contingency tables. I identify an endowment/manager as “central” 
in any year if its centrality measure is above the median centrality measure of all 
endowments/-managers reported that year, and as “peripheral” otherwise. I use 5-year intervals 
and only include the endowments/managers existing in all periods examined. In robustness tests, I 
also use periods ranging from 1-5 years.
Table 9 measures the number of institutions whose rank has stayed consistent over time (above 
or below median) or not, focusing on the centrality measure “Degree”. Central-Central (CC) for 
1992 is the count of the “central” players in 1992 which were also “central” in 1997. The odds ratio 
(Column 6) is the number of repeat central/peripheral  players  to the number of  those which switch
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((CC ∗ PP )/(CP ∗ PC)). The working hypothesis is that if centralities in the initial period cannot
predict centralities in the next periods, then the odds ratio would be 1. The distribution of the
log odds ratio (L) is approximated as normal with L ∼ N(log(OR), σ2), and the standard error of
the natural log of the odds ratio is approximated as σlog(odds ratio) =
√
1
C,C +
1
C,P +
1
P,C +
1
P,P (see
Brown and Goetzmann (1995)).11
The table shows that “central” or “peripheral” players in terms of degree centrality ranking per
year continue having similar rankings compared to other institutions in the future. The odds ratios
are above 1 in all cases and are statistically significant (the lowest bound of the confidence interval
is greater than 1), especially in the latest periods of the sample, where the number of observations
is also increased. This result generally holds for both endowments and managers, in BO and VC
networks alike. Therefore, the network’s structure tends to persist, meaning that the “key” and
“non-key” institutions tend to stay the same over time.
5.3 Manager Network Centrality and New Mandates
In this section, I explore whether a PE firm’s centrality in the previous year affects the number of
new mandates the firm wins in the future. I hypothesize that more centrally located firms would
get hired by more LPs the next period (a higher past network centrality measure would positively
relate to the number of new mandates from other university endowments the next period). This
hypothesis is consistent with well-connected managers in the network (employed by well-connected
endowments) getting more opportunities to win further mandates through the network information
flow than their not-so-well-connected counterparts. The centrality measures help take into account
not only the number of connections a PE firm has with endowments, but also the quality of these
connections.
In the regression outlined in Table 10, I examine the probability of a manager winning a new
mandate by an endowment the next year through a logit regression. I focus on the influence of the
manager’s past network centrality measures on this probability. The regression results show that
a high network centrality is associated with a greater probability that the manager wins an extra
mandate by a different endowment next year. For example, increasing Degree Centrality by one
11To test the hypothesis that the population odds ratio equals one, the two-sided p-value is 2P (Z < − | L |
/σlog(odds ratio)), where P denotes a probability and Z denotes a standard normal random variable.
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standard deviation holding all other variables constant, increases the probability of a BO manager 
being hired by an additional endowment next year by almost 2.5 times (Panel A). This result is 
evident for all centrality measures (degree, eigenvector centrality and betweenness) and controlling 
for manager characteristics such as size and performance, time and manager fixed effects. In the 
Appendix, I check the robustness of this result to using a Poisson regression for the number of new 
mandates a manager gets next year (Table A.3), as well as to using a different manager performance 
measure than the IRR, namely the Value Multiple (Table A.4). The results remain qualitatively 
unchanged.
Overall, the results show that a more “connected” PE manager is more likely to gain further 
mandates by endowments in the future.
5.4 Network Centrality and Manager Investment Performance
This section addresses how the PE managers’ location in the network is associated with their 
investment performance. I hypothesize the presence of a positive relationship between network 
centrality and investment performance in a delegated investment management setting in 
private markets. Rossi et al. (2018) confirm this relationship for public markets of UK equities.
I use the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) as a measure of manager performance, and present results 
from panel regressions using centrality as a covariate, while controlling for manager characteristics. 
Table 11 uses the centrality measures degree (Regressions (1)-(2)), eigenvector centrality (Regressions 
(3)-(4)) and betweenness (Regressions (5)-(6)), and shows results with and without the interaction 
term Network Centrality*Assets Under Management (AUM) of the PE manager.
Table 11 shows that there is a strong positive association of centrality with manager performance 
both for BO and for VC managers. The coefficients on the network measures are economically and 
statistically significant. In Panel A, one standard deviation increase in degree network centrality is 
associated with an increase in the expected BO manager return of approximately 3.4% per year. The 
corresponding results are stronger for VC firms both in terms of economic and statistical significance. 
Moreover, I find a significant negative interaction term of centrality and VC firm size in Panel B 
Regressions (1) and (3). This result confirms that the performance of small VC managers is              
more sensitive to network  centrality than that of  large managers. There is no such effect  for BO 
firms. A  possible  explanation for this effect could relate to the nature of investing of  VC  firms, which
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includes small amounts of money and uses syndication (Lindsey (2008)). These characteristics could
emphasize the importance of being well-connected in a network, especially for small players.
Overall, a more central network position places a manager in an advantageous position to re-
ceive and process information, as discussed in Rossi et al. (2018). More connected managers gain
further mandates from university endowments and have better investment performance, consistent
with these managers improving their ability to exploit investment opportunities through their net-
work connections. A more central network position would make it easier for a firm to observe its
competitors’ actions, gather information about their successful strategies, and become more visible
to endowments, which would relate to future mandates.
6 Individual Network Connections
In this section, I examine whether network connections between individuals play a role in the selection
of PE firms by university endowments. PE investments take place in private markets, thus exploring
the influence of personal connections on finding and accessing such investment opportunities is of
particular interest. These personal connections could either cause concern about possible conflicts
of interest in the selection of PE firms by endowments, or provide the means for efficient information
transfer about alpha-generating PE managers which might benefit the endowment and, as a result,
the university it supports. I connect firms with endowments using data on individuals working on
the investment management side of endowments and PE firms. I also connect firms with endowments
using data on the education of the individuals managing the PE funds (i.e. whether they are alumni
of the university the endowment supports).
I hypothesize that it is more likely for endowments to allocate mandates to PE firms whose
managers have a personal connection to the university or the endowment trustees, either through
past employment at the same fund, common education or by being alumni of the university.
There are several channels through which this hypothesis might work. First, allocating mandates
to connected managers could be due to the endowment trustees’ trust in the managers of the PE
fund and to more accurate information acquisition about their investment qualities, as a result of
lower information asymmetry. Second, endowment trustees might have limited attention during the
search for a manager, allocating funds to an existing PE firm they are acquainted with instead of
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expanding the search to the whole universe of available managers. Third, conflicts of interest may
arise if endowments allocate mandates to managers with whom they have a personal relationship,
irrespectively of their investment performance and practices.
6.1 Networks of Individuals
6.1.1 Boardex Network Associations
The Boardex North America dataset includes pre-created Company and Organizational Networks as
well as Individual Networks. Any two organizations are connected through the common appointment
of an individual at both institutions in the same period. I use the Company and Organizational
Networks to draw connections of university endowments with the PE firms they hire, by matching
the institutions in Boardex to the endowments and PE firms in the data. The Boardex networks
include the names of individuals who connect two institutions, the institutions and their types
(for example, universities or BO firms), the role of the individual at each of the institutions (for
example, trustee or board member) and the start and end dates of the appointment. For example,
an individual named “S Banks” was appointed as Chairman of the Board of ABRY Partners LLC
and was also a Trustee of Case Western Reserve University between 2002-2003. In the data, these
appointments create a connection between ABRY Partners and Case Western Reserve University.
I use these connections after the start of the common appointment. In the example above, ABRY
Partners LLC and Case Western University are connected after 2002.
Using the Boardex data on network associations, I find 140 such unique endowment-manager
associations for the years 1988-2008 (I only use overlaps starting before 2008, which is the last year
of my endowment sample). To match more connections spanning past appointments, I also connect
the endowments and PE firms manually. In this part of the analysis, I focus on BO firms, as Boardex
does not include a “Venture Capital” sector in their company classifications.
6.1.2 Manual Matching of Individual Networks
I identify trustees of university endowments in the data by sourcing individuals with a job description
related to the investment management section from Boardex. I also identify investment managers
of PE funds in the same way. I then identify connections between the individuals in the investment
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management function of the endowments and the portfolio managers of PE funds. BoardEx includes
comprehensive biographical data on individuals in business, ranging from top executives and board
directors to mid-level managers. Moreover, Boardex includes a variety of information regarding each
person’s profile (name, age, education), employment history, awards and affiliations with nonprofit
organizations. As already discussed, the percentage of universities reporting individuals in the
investment management functions of the endowment through Boardex is around 25%.12
I use the “Individual Profiles - Education and Employment” sections of the Boardex data to
identify the managers of the PE firms and track their education and achievements. Using the
Education data, I can identify investment professionals working at PE funds who are alumni of the
universities reported in my data (for example, obtained an undergraduate or graduate degree by
the university). In my empirical analysis, I use separate dummy variables to indicate the type of
connection of the PE firm to the endowment. I create a dummy variable (Employment Connection)
to indicate that the investment manager of the PE firm has also worked as a trustee in the endowment
in the past and another dummy variable (Education Connection) to indicate that the investment
manager has obtained a degree from the university that the endowment is supporting.
6.2 Determinants of PE Manager Selection by Endowments
In this section, I study the determinants of a PE firm’s success at being hired by an endowment,
focusing on personal connections. More specifically, I explore how much more likely it is for an
endowment to hire a PE firm to manage its portfolio if its trustees have a current or past connection
to the managers of the firm.
For my empirical analysis, I use a methodology similar to that of Kuhnen (2009). For each year
endowments make a hiring decision of a manager, the set of potential candidates for allocating PE
mandates includes all PE firms active in the market. I identify the PE managers an endowment could
choose from as the universe of the PE funds included in Boardex. I restrict the firms to the ones
reporting their portfolio managers to rule out cases where not identifying an individual connection
is due to lack of data. I also exclude managers currently employed by the endowment, as well as
those which have a minimum investment larger than the endowment’s size (on the assumption that
12Guidestar also has detailed information on non-profit organizations, including the individuals associated with
these organizations.
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the endowment would not be able to invest due to shortage of funds). Lastly, I also require that
the managers in the manager-endowment pairs can be matched to their institutional characteristics
through Thomson Reuters. Subsampling the data according to the criteria above results in 119
endowments choosing from 461 managers for their portfolios over 1988-2008. These PE firms are in
the Thomson Reuters dataset, and also report their managers through Boardex.
As in Kuhnen (2009), I model the process of selecting a PE manager using the random utility
model of McFadden (1973). Kuhnen (2009) suggests this model is the most appropriate estimation
procedure in settings where only the best alternative amongst many is chosen. For an endowment
i, the utility from choosing an investment manager j is yij = β′xij + ij , where xij is a vector
of characteristics of the PE manager and ij are unobservable factors which affect utility. If PE
manager j is the choice for endowment i maximizing the endowment’s utility, McFadden (1973)
shows that the probability that a candidate PE manager j is chosen is the following13:
Prob(yi = j|xi) = e
β′xij
J∑
h=0
eβ
′xih
(5)
I use a panel data set containing all possible pairs of endowment-manager relationships at the
time of hiring, according to the constraints mentioned above. In binary logistic regressions, the
dependent variable y takes the value 1 or 0 for each endowment-manager pair if the endowment
hired the manager or not, accordingly. The explanatory variable is also binary and takes the value
1 if the endowment has an individual connection to the manager, and 0 if not. For every year in my
sample, I label an endowment as “actively hiring” if the endowment is adding a new PE manager
to its yearly list of managers. I am not able to identify endowments that considered hiring PE
managers in a particular year but in the end did not. Thus, the results presented will indicate what
characteristics of PE firms endowments look for when deciding to allocate mandates, conditional on
them actively hiring a new PE firm. As potential determinants of the choice of PE firms, I include
PE firm characteristics that relate to reputation, such as AUM or age.
Estimating the conditional logit model in equation (5) shows that connection measures are
13McFadden (1973) assumes independently distributed ij with Weibull distribution F (ij) = exp(−e−ij ).
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significant and positive predictors of which PE manager is selected, controlling for observable char-
acteristics of candidate firms. The estimation results in Table 12 suggest that employment and
education connections of individuals working in PE firms play a role in their selection by university
endowments. If the managers of the PE firm are connected to the endowment trustees or are alumni
of the university, they are more likely to be hired by the endowment. The economic magnitude of
the coefficients is also significant. For example, if an endowment is considering hiring a PE firm, it is
10 times more likely to hire a PE firm that employs someone who has graduated from the university
the endowment supports. Similarly, an employment connection of the PE firm with the endowment
in the past makes it 14 times more likely for the firm to be selected.
I also test whether the magnitude of the assets of either the endowment or the PE manager
affects the measures of connectedness. I hypothesize that, for example, larger funds might be
less likely to hire based on connections, potentially due to better governance mechanisms to avoid
conflicts of interest. On the other hand, a larger university might have a more connected and loyal
alumni base that might magnify the connectedness effect. In the regressions, I interact measures
of connectedness and the assets of the PE firms or the endowments (Assets Under Management
and Market Values, respectively). However, I find no differential effect in support of either of the
aforementioned hypotheses.
Overall, the results show that personal connections of individuals working in investment man-
agement play a role in the selection of PE firms by university endowments.
6.3 Network Channels
In this analysis, I examine the networks of institutions as well as individuals working on these
institutions (for the BO firms). These two types of connections are used to examine different
questions relating to PE manager appointment by endowments. For the institutional network, I
examine whether a manager that is well-connected with endowments and other managers is more
likely to gain further investment from other endowments as well as better investment performance.
For the network of individuals, I focus on the specific manager appointments by endowments, and
examine whether acquaintance of their respective managers makes it more likely to invest together
in the future.
To try to disentangle the potential channels for the information and network effects to flow, I
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examine the correlation of an endowment’s centrality with the average centrality across all managers
that it invests in. For the BO network, I find no evidence of a relationship between an endowment’s
centrality and the average centrality of its managers. However, for the VC network, there exists a
correlation of around 10% and is statistically significant.
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the BO networks are mainly influenced by
the personal connections of the endowment and firm managers, while the influence of institutional
networks is larger for endowments and VC firms.
7 Conclusion
University endowments provide an excellent laboratory to study how social networks affect choices
made by an asset owner in private markets. These endowments have a long term investment horizon
and often have the institutional flexibility to pursue fairly unrestricted investment opportunities.
Using a novel hand-collected data set of endowments beginning in 1988, I study their PE firm
appointments. Endowments’ adoption of decentralized investment management, employing multiple
investment firms to manage their portfolios, gives rise to a network of connections between them
and PE managers.
In a social network setting, this study considers how endowments and PE managers gain access
to each other through their network connections, and whether critical network positioning of insti-
tutions plays a role in endowments’ selection of investments. A network analysis takes into account
both the number and the quality of connections through which information can flow. I separate PE
investments in BO and VC and study them separately. In the beginning of the period examined, the
network structure of endowments and VC firms was much more developed than its BO counterpart
in terms of number of players and connections between them. However, both networks have grown
denser over time and the identity of their key institutions has stayed the same. Central network
positioning of PE managers is positively associated with the number of new mandates they gain
from other university endowments in subsequent periods, as well as their investment performance.
Moving from firm-level to individual-level networks, I consider connections of endowment trustees
and PE portfolio managers. I find that if an individual was employed by an endowment in the past
or is an alumnus of the university the endowment supports, the likelihood of her firm getting hired
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by the endowment rises significantly.
Overall, an analysis of delegated portfolio management in a social network context is important
as it can determine a crucial yet under-explored source of investment opportunities, namely the
ability of institutions to exploit their firm- and individual-level connections. My paper provides
evidence that these connections are particularly important for investments in the private space.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Bipartite network for five endowments and their BO investment managers in 2008
The grey squares represent university endowments, and the black circles represent BO firms. The
name of the university endowment or BO manager is provided above its respective node.
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Figure 2: PE Investment Managers: One-mode projections of the two-mode affiliation network
This figure plots a network example of two BO firms (Drum Capital Management and Alta
Advisors) connected through same university endowment appointments in 2008. The name of the
BO manager is provided above its respective node.
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Figure 3: Endowments: One-mode projections of the two-mode affiliation network
This figure plots a network example of two endowments (Chapman University and Yeshiva
University) connected through same BO investment manager appointments in 2008. The name of
the university endowment is provided above its respective node.
77
78
Figure 4: Evolution of network connections of university endowments with BO and VC managers
This figure plots the evolution of the network connections between university endowments and BO
and VC managers from 1988 to 2008. The grey squares represent university endowments, and the
black circles represent BO or VC firms.
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Table 1: University endowment summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for all university endowments in the sample, for the period
1985-2008. The summary statistics reported are the number of universities included in the dataset
each year, the market value (MV in thousands US dollars) of the average endowment in the
sample, the average age (in years), the percentage of the universities that belong to the Doctoral
Carnegie Classification (offer PhD degrees), and the average full-time equivalent (FTE) students.
Year Number ofUniversities
MV Average
($000s)
Age
Average
% Doctoral
Class.
FTE students
Average
1985 258 100,844 129 31% 8,805
1990 343 153,958 126 21% 4,517
1995 436 218,334 124 17% 5,532
2000 509 264,575 122 28% 8,548
2005 702 250,053 119 23% 7,448
2008 722 292,180 118 21% 9,245
Table 2: Asset allocation of university endwoments
This table presents the portfolio allocation of the university endowments in the sample, for years
1989 and 2008. Alternative assets are hedge funds and PE investments (BO and VC). Equity and
Bonds include both domestic as well as international mandates. Endowments are split with respect
to their market values in years 1989 and 2008. I calculate both dollar-weighted and equal-weighted
averages of endowment asset allocations.
Total Endowment Size Equity Bonds AlternativeAssets Real Estate Other Cash
1989
Over $1 billion 49.7 16.4 4.6 4.7 0.6 7.0
From $501 million to 1 billion 49.0 31.9 5.1 2.5 0.4 7.7
From $100 million to 500 million 52.9 27.9 1.3 2.1 0.4 12.4
Under $101 million 46.8 32.3 0.6 2.2 0.2 13.0
Dollar-weighted average 46.6 24.0 3.2 2.8 0.4 8.7
Equal-weighted average 48.6 30.8 1.1 2.3 0.2 12.5
2008
Over $1 billion 37.9 9.9 25.3 5.8 0.0 0.9
From $501 million to 1 billion 40.3 11.1 26.5 5.6 0.0 1.1
From $100 million to 500 million 48.5 14.5 18.0 4.4 0.0 1.8
Under $101 million 53.3 19.8 9.7 3.4 0.0 3.4
Dollar-weighted average 34.8 9.7 23.5 5.1 0.0 0.5
Equal-weighted average 49.5 16.7 14.9 4.1 0.0 2.5
80
Table 3: Endowment fund summary statistics
This table calculates the average number of managers employed by university endowments for their
total portfolio mandates, their Buyout (BO) and Venture Capital (VC) investments. Manager
figures are averaged accross university endowments, irrespectively of whether the universities
allocate parts of their portfolio to BO or VC.
Year
Total Number
of Managers
(av)
Number of
BO Managers
(av)
Number of
VC Managers
(av)
% Allocation
in PE max
% Allocation
in VC max
1988 7.0 0.09 0.74 0.20 10.80 0.70 18.30
1990 7.3 0.10 0.60 0.17 7.90 0.59 11.90
1992 7.7 0.09 0.57 0.14 9.40 0.53 13.40
1994 11.1 0.14 0.80 0.18 9.60 0.63 12.60
1996 12.4 0.19 0.98 0.24 8.50 0.82 14.60
1998 14.4 0.47 1.03 0.48 12.10 0.84 12.60
2000 14.4 0.56 1.05 0.93 21.90 2.36 33.60
2002 17.8 1.04 1.22 1.30 22.70 1.18 21.00
2004 17.9 1.12 1.07 1.57 21.00 1.03 20.00
2006 21.0 1.79 1.23 2.27 26.20 1.02 20.00
2008 24.1 2.60 1.18 3.48 26.00 1.06 17.90
Table 4: Private equity manager summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for all Private Equity (PE) managers associated with the
university endowments in the sample, for the period 1988-2008. All figures are expressed in US
dollars, and are averaged across the investment managers in the sample.
Year No. ofFirms
Avg Equity
Per Company
No. of
Comp.
No.
of Deals
Sum of
Eq. Invest.
Founded
Year
Latest
Fund Size
1988 148 9,186,431 11.5 13.5 51,230,399 1979 708,073,891
1990 141 2,473,012 10.1 13.2 18,344,399 1979 733,713,180
1992 150 5,431,579 10.5 14.1 31,834,308 1981 781,659,767
1994 173 3,237,870 9.4 12.1 24,728,501 1982 718,696,904
1996 227 5,551,971 11.7 14.9 50,120,803 1984 691,984,188
1998 288 6,838,666 11.7 13.8 60,765,168 1985 668,655,525
2000 375 10,573,126 17.5 20.7 150,008,948 1987 638,657,946
2002 336 9,620,506 8.1 9.0 58,857,273 1988 652,289,378
2004 332 9,682,711 10.0 11.4 83,487,762 1989 743,623,680
2006 361 10,862,546 10.8 12.5 116,177,139 1989 673,891,956
2008 362 16,570,062 11.1 13.0 124,163,671 1990 646,860,292
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Table 5: Summary statistics and network centrality measures
This table presents the distribution of the centrality measures for endowments and managers. In
these networks, endowments are connected through common manager appointments, and managers
are connected through common endowment appointments. Panels A and B report summary
statistics for Buyout (BO) networks, and Panels C and D for Venture Capital (VC) networks.
Statistics are reported in years 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008.
Panel A: University Endowments (BO)
Measure Mean Std. Dev Min Max
2008 Degree 96.8 78.6 0.0 225.0
Betweenness 106.5 205.9 0.0 1535.1
Eig. Centrality 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.0
2003 Degree 53.0 47.6 0.0 120.0
Betweenness 74.2 176.2 0.0 1120.6
Eig. Centrality 0.4 0.4 0.0 1.0
1998 Degree 14.6 13.0 0.0 40.0
Betweenness 33.5 105.0 0.0 823.2
Eig. Centrality 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
1993 Degree 1.6 2.0 0.0 8.0
Betweenness 1.2 5.0 0.0 26.0
Eig. Centrality 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0
1988 Degree 2.2 2.1 0.0 6.0
Betweenness 0.8 2.1 0.0 7.0
Eig. Centrality 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.0
Panel B: BO Managers
Measure Mean Std. Dev Min Max
2008 Degree 20.0 24.8 0.0 240.0
Betweenness 308.8 1624.4 0.0 31921.0
Eig. Centrality 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0
2003 Degree 9.9 12.0 0.0 94.0
Betweenness 146.5 581.5 0.0 6979.2
Eig. Centrality 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0
1998 Degree 6.7 7.4 0.0 50.0
Betweenness 48.9 194.5 0.0 1677.5
Eig. Centrality 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0
1993 Degree 2.1 2.5 0.0 8.0
Betweenness 0.4 2.2 0.0 12.0
Eig. Centrality 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0
1988 Degree 4.4 3.4 0.0 10.0
Betweenness 1.3 3.4 0.0 13.0
Eig. Centrality 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0
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Panel C: University Endowments (VC)
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2008 Degree 71.0 56.6 0.0 129.0
Betweenness 41.9 98.2 0.0 571.2
Eig. Centrality 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0
2003 Degree 71.4 56.3 0.0 135.0
Betweenness 43.1 122.2 0.0 819.9
Eig. Centrality 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.0
1998 Degree 47.2 37.3 0.0 103.0
Betweenness 47.5 138.8 0.0 1011.5
Eig. Centrality 0.4 0.4 0.0 1.0
1993 Degree 19.1 17.1 0.0 54.0
Betweenness 27.1 65.1 0.0 383.0
Eig. Centrality 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.0
1988 Degree 5.5 5.2 0.0 21.0
Betweenness 16.0 28.2 0.0 137.2
Eig. Centrality 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0
Panel D: VC Managers
Measure Mean Std. Dev Min Max
2008 Degree 8.7 11.8 0.0 134.0
Betweenness 158.7 1186.8 0.0 19003.5
Eig. Centrality 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
2003 Degree 10.3 14.5 0.0 124.0
Betweenness 119.5 744.1 0.0 11365.2
Eig. Centrality 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
1998 Degree 11.6 14.2 0.0 70.0
Betweenness 121.7 394.8 0.0 3264.4
Eig. Centrality 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
1993 Degree 8.9 8.6 0.0 53.0
Betweenness 76.6 243.7 0.0 1667.2
Eig. Centrality 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0
1988 Degree 8.6 7.5 0.0 39.0
Betweenness 62.2 172.6 0.0 990.5
Eig. Centrality 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0
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Table 6: Time series of the average normalized centrality measures for managers and endowments
This table presents the standardized centrality measures (Degree, Betweenness, Eigenvector
Centrality) for the one-mode network of endowments (E) and managers (M), from 1988-2008. The
standardized measures are calculated according to Equation (4). Each year I subtract from each
centrality measure its time series average and divide it by the standard deviation over the full
sample. Panel A presents the results for the Buyout (BO) network and Panel B presents the
results for the Venture Capital (VC) network.
Panel A: BO Network
Year Deg. E Bet. E Eig. E Deg. M Bet. M. Eig. M
1988 -0.89 -0.41 0.43 -0.46 -0.18 2.14
1990 -0.90 -0.41 -0.40 -0.63 -0.18 0.51
1992 -0.91 -0.42 -0.56 -0.56 -0.18 1.56
1994 -0.88 -0.41 -0.25 -0.53 -0.18 0.64
1996 -0.87 -0.37 -0.28 -0.51 -0.17 0.71
1998 -0.68 -0.23 0.00 -0.32 -0.14 0.26
2000 -0.52 -0.30 0.24 -0.39 -0.15 0.16
2002 -0.04 -0.14 0.24 -0.21 -0.05 0.01
2004 0.01 0.10 0.13 -0.11 0.04 -0.03
2006 0.17 0.11 -0.05 0.14 0.03 -0.17
2008 0.66 0.19 -0.07 0.46 0.12 -0.29
Panel B: VC Network
Year Deg. E Bet. E Eig. E Deg. M Bet. M. Eig. M
1988 -0.95 -0.21 -0.64 -0.12 -0.07 0.17
1990 -0.92 -0.12 -0.46 -0.28 -0.08 0.24
1992 -0.82 -0.15 -0.29 -0.20 -0.09 0.43
1994 -0.51 -0.08 -0.18 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01
1996 -0.25 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.12
1998 -0.11 0.08 -0.10 0.12 0.01 -0.04
2000 -0.02 -0.01 0.22 -0.17 0.00 0.01
2002 0.25 -0.03 0.06 0.11 0.00 -0.11
2004 0.24 0.12 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.13
2006 0.47 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.07 -0.09
2008 0.37 0.03 0.23 -0.11 0.06 -0.16
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Table 9: Degree persistence for managers and endowments
This table reports contingency tables for the ranking of centrality measures for endowments and 
managers. I examine Buyout (BO) and Venture Capital (VC) networks separately. I identify an 
endowment as central in a year if its centrality measure is above the median centrality measure of all 
endowments reported that year, and as peripheral otherwise. The same method is used to identify 
central and peripheral players for BO and VC managers. The tables are compiled using 5-year 
intervals and only include the endowments or managers that exist in both periods examined. For 
example, CentralCentral (CC) for 1992 is the count of central players in 1992 that were also central 
players in 1997. The odds ratio is the number of repeat central or peripheral players to the number of 
those that switch categories over the interval examined. For brevity, data points in 4 years are 
reported. Column 6 reports the Odds Ratio, column 7 is the log(Odds Ratio), column 8 reports the 
standard error of the log(Odds Ratio), and column 9 reports the lower bound of the confindence 
interval (Odds Ratio different than 1). Panel A presents results for BO networks and Panel B for VC 
networks.
PANEL A: BO
BO Managers
Year Central(t+5)
Peripheral
(t+5)
Odds R.
(OR) log(OR) SE
CI
Lower
1992 Central (t) 2 1 3 8.0 2.1 1.7 0.3
Peripheral (t) 1 4 5
3 5
1996 Central (t) 4 1 5 11.0 2.4 1.3 0.9
Peripheral (t) 1 11 12
5 12
2000 Central (t) 22 1 23 101.2 4.6 1.1 10.9
Peripheral (t) 5 23 28
27 24
2002 Central (t) 38 7 45 7.6 2.0 0.5 2.9
Peripheral (t) 22 31 53
60 38
University Endowments in BO Networks
Year Central(t+5)
Peripheral
(t+5) Sum
Odds R.
(OR) log(OR) SE
CI
Lower
1992 Central (t) 1 1 2 2.5 0.9 1.6 0.1
Peripheral (t) 2 5 7
3 6
1996 Central (t) 4 3 7 8.0 2.1 1.3 0.6
Peripheral (t) 1 6 7
5 9
2000 Central (t) 6 1 7 5.8 1.8 1.1 0.7
Peripheral (t) 28 27 55
34 28
2002 Central (t) 18 1 19 13.5 2.6 1.0 1.7
Peripheral (t) 52 91
70 40
39
Sum
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PANEL B: VC
Panel 1: VC Managers
Year Central(t+5)
Peripheral
(t+5)
Odds R.
(OR) log(OR) SE
CI
Lower
1992 Central (t) 13 6 19 2.6 1.0 0.7 0.7
Peripheral (t) 9 11 20
22 17
1996 Central (t) 24 1 25 22.3 3.1 1.1 2.6
Peripheral (t) 14 13 27
38 14
2000 Central (t) 39 9 48 19.5 3.0 0.5 7.2
Peripheral (t) 10 45 55
49 54
2002 Central (t) 55 5 60 47.7 3.9 0.6 15.7
Peripheral (t) 12 52 64
67 57
Panel 2: University Endowments in VC Networks
Year Central(t+5)
Peripheral
(t+5) Sum
Odds R.
(OR) log(OR) SE
CI
Lower
1992 Central (t) 3 16 19 1.5 0.4 1.0 0.2
Peripheral (t) 2 16 18
5 32
1996 Central (t) 1 4 5 1.6 0.5 1.2 0.2
Peripheral (t) 7 45 52
8 49
2000 Central (t) 8 2 10 24.7 3.2 0.8 4.7
Peripheral (t) 12 74 86
20 76
2002 Central (t) 14 1 15 113.3 4.7 1.1 13.6
Peripheral (t) 11 89 100
25 90
88
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Table 11: Network centrality and performance
This table reports results for panel regressions of the PE manager’s performance on the manager’s
centrality measures (degree, eigenvector centrality, betweenness). Degree is presented in columns
1-2, Eigenvector Centrality is presented in columns 3-4 and Betweenness in columns 5-6. The panel
regressions use as control variables the assets under management (in million US dollars) and the
age of the PE firm (in years). Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and are clustered by
time. The time period is 1989-2008, the regressions include year and manager fixed effects and
standard errors are clustered by time. Panel A presents results for Buyout (BO) networks, and
Panel B for Venture Capital (VC) networks.
PANEL A: BO Managers
Dependent variable:
(1) (2)
BO Performance 
(IRR)
(3) (4)
(5) (6)
Degree 3.383∗ 3.441∗∗
(1.704) (1.224)
Eigenvector Cent 2.720∗ 2.348∗
(1.376) (1.166)
Betweenness 1.230 1.515∗
(0.722) (0.967)
AUM −0.189 −0.167 −0.010 −0.169 −0.086 −0.120
(0.284) (0.123) (0.254) (0.124) (0.161) (0.120)
Age 0.497∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) (0.121)
Degree*AUM 0.010
(0.217)
Eig. Cent.*AUM −0.131
(0.181)
Between.*AUM −0.063
(0.159)
Constant 3.270 3.220 4.020 4.560 5.402∗ 5.520∗
(3.470) (3.386) (3.322) (3.228) (3.068) (3.048)
Manager FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 233 233 233 233 233 233
R2 0.082 0.082 0.078 0.076 0.077 0.076
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.070 0.062 0.064 0.061 0.064
F Statistic 5.102∗∗∗ 6.832∗∗∗ 4.817∗∗∗ 6.261∗∗∗ 4.743∗∗∗ 6.294∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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PANEL B: VC Managers
Dependent variable:
VC Performance (IRR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Degree 11.752∗∗∗ 7.820∗∗∗
(3.322) (2.392)
Eigenvector Cent 10.256∗∗∗ 6.526∗∗∗
(2.751) (1.850)
Betweenness 2.913 2.025
(2.152) (1.344)
AUM 0.333 −0.227 0.299 −0.232 −0.078 −0.150
(0.394) (0.280) (0.366) (0.280) (0.304) (0.283)
Age 0.154 0.179 0.156 0.172 0.164 0.182
(0.220) (0.221) (0.219) (0.220) (0.226) (0.224)
Degree*AUM −0.707∗∗
(0.350)
Eig. Cent.*AUM −0.673∗∗
(0.293)
Between.*AUM −0.207
(0.280)
Constant 10.650∗ 12.978∗∗ 11.859∗∗ 14.576∗∗∗ 19.315∗∗∗ 19.128∗∗∗
(5.628) (5.491) (5.419) (5.310) (5.184) (5.180)
Manager FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 381 381 381 381 381 381
R2 0.042 0.031 0.049 0.036 0.010 0.008
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.024 0.039 0.028 −0.001 0.0004
F Statistic 4.104∗∗∗ 4.083∗∗∗ 4.829∗∗∗ 4.630∗∗∗ 0.924 1.052
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 12: Connections and Other Predictors of PE Manager Selection by University Endowments
This table presents a conditional logit model of PE manager selection by university endowments. 
Each endowment hiring a PE manager at time t can choose among all PE managers existing at 
time t-1. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the endowment-manager pairs 
with a hiring event at time t. Employment Connection is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a trustee 
of the university and a member of the managing team of the PE firm have worked together in the 
past, and 0 otherwise. Education Connection is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the managing team 
of the PE fund includes alumni of the university. Lag Manager AUM is the PE manager assets 
under management the previous year, Lag Manager Age is the age of the PE firm (in years), and Lag 
Endw MV is the market value (in US$ mil) of the endowment that makes the hiring. The rest of the 
variables are interaction terms. The regression contains hiring decisions for years 1988-2008 and 
includes year and manager fixed effects.
Dependent variable:
Dummy = 1 if Endowment Hired the PE Manager
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employment Connection 2.760∗∗∗ 2.593∗∗∗ 2.356∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.164) (0.102)
Education Connection 2.473∗∗∗ 2.379∗∗∗ 2.285∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.188) (0.148)
Lag Manager AUM −0.028∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag Manager Age 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.027) (0.008)
Lag Endw. MV 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Empl. Conn * Lag Man. AUM −0.008 −0.008
(0.009) (0.032)
Empl. Conn * Lag Endw. MV −0.001 0.003
(0.013) (0.021)
Educ. Conn * Lag Man. AUM 0.009 −0.008
(0.012) (0.022)
Educ. Con * Lag Endw. MV −0.003 0.003
(0.014) (0.032)
Manager FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63,283 63,283 63,283 63,283 63,283
Max. Possible R2 0.101 0.101 0.096 0.096 0.096
Log Likelihood −420.145 −399.312 −408.115 −396.359 −510.690
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix
A. Data
A1. Asset Classifications
NACUBO’s asset classifications for PE mandates have changed over time. While the VC asset
classification has remained constant throughout the sample, the BO asset classification has gone
through various name changes. Table A.1 illustrates these.
Table A.1: Asset Classification Changes for PE Investments
This table presents the time series of NACUBO’s asset classifications for reporting external PE
investment managers (BO and VC).
Year Category Name
1984-1993 Venture Capital and Leveraged Buyouts
1994-1997 Venture Capital and Buyouts
1998-1999 Venture Capital and Non-Venture Private Equity (Buyouts)
2000-2001 Venture Capital and Private Equity (Buyouts)
2002-2008 Venture Capital and Private Equity
A2. Investment Manager Reporting
Most universities that participate in the NACUBO study report their external investment man-
agers in the “Investment Managers” section of the NACUBO report. I can identify a university as 
choosing not to report its investment managers when I can find market values reported in the same 
report, but I do not find the university in the “Investment Managers” section of the same report.
Table A.2 calculates the percentage of universities reporting in NACUBO, that also report in 
the “Investment Managers” section. Throughout the sample, the majority of the universities per 
year report in this section (the total reporting percentage every year ranges from 81% to 98%). This 
observation is consistent throughout the years of my sample as well as the different market value 
categories. The only category with relatively low percentage reporting was the one with the highest 
market value (more than 1 US$ bil) during the early 2000s.
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Table A.2: Percentage of endowments that report in the NACUBO Investment Managers Section
This table calculates the percentage of endowments that report investment managers in the
Investment Managers section of the NACUBO reports. I identify an endowment as reporting in
general in the NACUBO report if it reports its market value. I identify an endowment as not
reporting in the Investment Managers section if it reports its market value but not its external
managers.
Year % reporting(total) >1 bil ($)
500 m -
1 bil ($)
100 m -
500 m ($) <100 m ($)
1988 0.85 0.80 1.00 0.93 0.82
1993 0.92 0.69 0.79 0.95 0.93
1994 0.95 0.88 1.00 0.95 0.95
1995 0.95 0.82 0.90 0.98 0.95
1996 0.90 0.75 0.93 0.90 0.91
1997 0.93 0.88 0.89 0.94 0.93
1998 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.95 0.93
1999 0.81 0.62 0.81 0.83 0.83
2000 0.89 0.55 0.87 0.94 0.91
2001 0.95 0.66 0.96 0.96 0.98
2002 0.96 0.85 0.93 0.97 0.98
2003 0.96 0.82 0.94 0.97 0.97
2004 0.96 0.83 0.96 0.96 0.98
2005 0.97 0.82 0.98 0.97 0.99
2006 0.97 0.82 0.98 0.97 1.00
2007 0.98 0.91 0.98 0.98 1.00
2008 0.96 0.84 0.92 0.97 0.98
B. Robustness
B1. New Mandates - Regression Specification
Table A.3 checks the robustness of the result in Table 10 using a Poisson regression specification.
In Table A.3, I regress the number of new mandates each BO (Panel A) or VC firm (Panel B)
gets on the past network centrality of the firm. The regression controls for manager characteristics
relating to reputation such as the firm’s size and age, as well as year and manager fixed effects. Table
A.3 shows that for the baseline estimation (an equally-weighted average of centrality measures), a
higher lagged centrality measure for the manager leads to a higher number of new mandates won
the next period14. The result holds for all measures of centrality examined in Section 4 (degree,
14Poisson regressions are often used in studies to model count variables and contingency tables. For example,
Lerner (1995), Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Yermack (1996) study the determinants of the number of new
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betweenness and eigenvector centrality). Panel A shows that increasing Degree Centrality by one
standard deviation holding all other variables constant, increases the probability of a BO manager
being hired by an additional endowment next year by almost 2.2 times (Panel A). The rest of the
coefficients have similar interpretations. Overall, the result in Table 10 holds for a different regression
specification that takes into account the number of new mandates gained by the endowment.
B2. Manager Performance - Value Multiple Measure
I examine the robustness of the regression specification in Table 10 to the choice of performance
measure for BO and VC firms. In Table A.4, I control for performance using the Value Multiple
measure instead of the IRR, and the regression results remain unchanged.15 There still exists a
positive and significant association of the lagged network centrality measure with the probability of
the firm winning a new endowment mandate the next period.
board members and the number of director appointments or departures in companies.
15According to Preqin, this multiple is defined as the ratio between the total value that the LP has derived from 
its interest in the partnership (i.e. distributed cash and securities plus the value of the LP’s remaining interest in the 
partnership) and its total cash investment in the partnership. It is a measure of ‘profit’ or ‘loss’ for the LP.
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3. Are University Endowments Really Long-Term
Investors?
Abstract
This paper examines the investment strategy evolution of U.S. university endowments as
well as their investing behavior around the most important financial crises since the beginning
of the 20th century. I use a unique long-term dataset on endowment characteristics and
allocations from 1900 to 2016 of twelve important U.S. university endowments. The analysis
documents the evolution of their asset allocations, including the early adoption of equity
investing in the 1930s and the more recent shift into alternative assets. Endowments also
invest countercyclically around crises, decreasing their allocation to risky assets before a
crisis onset and increasing them after a crisis onset, in marked contrast to other types of
institutional investors.
Keywords: Investments, financial markets, crises, university endowments
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1 Introduction
Endowments are investment funds aiming to meet the needs of their beneficiaries over multiple
generations and to adhere to the principle of intergenerational equity (Tobin (1974)). Hence,
they are distinctive among investors in having the opportunity to focus on long-term investment
objectives while not having to worry so much about short-term liquidity needs. The styles
and strategies of some university endowments in particular, have provided a template many
subsequent institutional and individual investors have followed in recent years. While scholars
have previously examined the history of insurance companies and investment trusts, very little
long-run analysis has been undertaken of such long-horizon investors as university endowments,
notwithstanding the fact that many are long-lived.
This study exploits a new long-run data set of endowment investments to examine two ques-
tions. Firstly, I analyze how the investment strategy of U.S. university endowments has evolved
since the beginning of the 20th century. In particular, I document the major shifts in their
asset allocation over this time. Secondly, I examine whether these funds do, indeed behave as
long-term investors by examining their investment behavior around the time of major financial
crises. Recent studies have found that such institutional investors as pension funds and mutual
funds behave procyclically during crises – that is, buying assets when prices are high and selling
them when they are low (Manconi et al. (2012), Papaioannou et al. (2013), Duijm and Steins
Bisschop (2018)). According to Jones (2017), a considerable segment of institutional investors
had incentives to “bubble ride” during crises due to such factors as benchmarking, peer group
herding pressure and short-term performance evaluation windows. In contrast, one might expect
endowments to exploit their long investment horizon and to behave countercyclically – that is,
selling assets when prices are high and buying them when they are low.
To address each of these questions, I exploit hand-collected data on the twelve wealthiest U.S.
university endowments in the early decades of the 20th century. For each university, I collect
data from 1900 to the present on endowment characteristics such as their asset allocations and
investment returns. In terms of the evolution of their investment strategy, I document two major
shifts in asset allocation consistent with prior studies: the first from bonds to stocks beginning
in the 1930s and the second from stocks to alternative assets beginning in the 1980s. Moreover,
the Ivy League schools (and notably, Harvard, Yale and Princeton) led the way in these asset
allocation moves in both eras. I explore the rationale behind these major shifts in investment
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strategy.
Next, I analyze the asset allocation responses of endowments before and after the onset of
the six “worst” financial crises since 1900 in the U.S. as defined by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009):
1906-1907, 1929, 1937, 1973-74, 2000 and 2008. In each episode, I calculate the active portfolio
allocation changes in risky assets (equities and alternative assets). Following Calvet et al. (2009)
and Bams et al. (2016), I deconstruct the total changes in risky asset allocations into a passive
change (due to the overall market movement) and an active change (due to rebalancing by
the endowment). My main finding is that typically during the run-up to a crisis, endowments
decrease their active risky allocations; while after the crisis onset, they actively increase these
allocations as risky asset prices fall. This evidence suggests that endowments do, indeed tend to
invest countercyclically.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the background on university
endowment management since the inception of university endowments. Section 3 discusses the
relevant literature on financial market crises, institutional investor strategies around times of
distress, and endowment investing. Section 4 describes the data, while Section 5 documents the
evolution of university endowment investment strategies over the long run. Section 6 analyses
their behavior around the most important crises since the beginning of the 20th century. Section
7 concludes.
2 Historical Evolution of Endowment Investing
The so-called “U.S. endowment model”, often attributed to Yale University and its chief invest-
ment officer (CIO) David Swensen, is an investment approach characterized by diversification,
active management, equity orientation and illiquid assets (Swensen (2009)). Chambers and Dim-
son (2015) claim that the writings of John Maynard Keynes were a considerable influence on
David Swensen. More specifically, Chambers and Dimson (2013) and Chambers et al. (2015)
document Keynes’s revolutionary shift to equities in the early 1920s and evaluate his investment
strategies, suggesting that some of the lessons he learned remain relevant to endowments to-
day. Moreover, Keynes had investment insights in switching into equities, as his move preceded
the leading U.S. university endowments in the mid-20th century. In retrospect, equities have
had a very substantial long-term real return since 1900 and proved to be the best performing
investment of the 20th century (Dimson et al. (2002, 2018)).
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In recent years, endowments emerged as a class of highly sophisticated institutional investors
with considerable amounts of capital and excellent reputation. Their long-term investment profile
and their low short-term liquidity needs have helped them take more risks and move into new (for
each era) asset classes earlier than other investors. Moreover, nowadays, endowment investment
committees are composed of financially literate members led by CIOs with relevant industry
experience. In explaining the reasons for their long-term investment success, Yale University, for
example, regularly considers opportunities and strategies ignored by other investors and relies
heavily on the identification of top-tier managers (Yale Endowment Report, 2017). Yale has used
its extensive network to foster partnerships with idiosyncratic, alpha-generating managers, and
established its reputation for collaborating with premier firms that might otherwise be reluctant
to open to outside capital. U.S. university endowments have evolved to become a distinctive and
innovative class of investment institutions.
2.1 Inception Until the 1960s
The style of investment management practiced by endowments has changed dramatically
since their inception (Kochard and Rittereiser (2008)). Endowment funds can be traced back
to the fifteenth century when donors in England made gifts to universities to support them
in perpetuity. Usually, these gifts carried the restriction that the donated capital needed to
be preserved, although the income from the endowment could be spent. Donors frequently
restricted the use of an endowment for a specific purpose, such as professorships or scholarships.
Endowments were intended to be a permanent source of income for institutions that traditionally
did not have income.
Up to the end of the 1960s, endowment assets were managed by wealthy trustees of the
colleges and were placed under strict rules forbidding delegation of investment decisions and
limiting discretion in spending (Kochard and Rittereiser (2008)). Ellis and Vertin (1991) suggest
that American colleges and universities did not increase their endowments through investment
management as much as other general growth funds. The performance track record of endow-
ments was also not comparable to their current performance records. For example, around 1928
and for nearly a decade, Yale devised a rebalancing plan out of equities and into bonds, which
led Yale to miss out on one of the greatest bull markets post-World War II (Ellis and Vertin
(1989)).
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2.2 Changes in the 1970s
Towards the end of the 1960s, McGeorge Bundy at the Ford Foundation became concerned
about the rising costs of higher education and studied ways to make the management of the
endowment more productive. In 1969, the Foundation published two studies as “Reports to
the Ford Foundation”, suggesting changes in the management of the endowments. The reports
identified endowments as corporations with one beneficiary and its trustees as representatives of
the institution responsible for setting policy on spending and investing. Investing was allowed
to be delegated to outside investment advisers, subject to the appropriate monitoring of the
trustees. In the Ford Foundation annual report published in 1967, Bundy wrote:
We believe there may be room for great improvement here. It is far from clear that
trustees have reason to be proud of their performance in making money for their
colleges. We recognize the risks of unconventional investing, but the true test of
performance in the handling of money is the record of achievement, not the opinion
of the respectable.
Few institutions had the capacity to manage their endowments pursuing this new recommended
investment approach. As a result, the Commonfund was established as an investment company
that pools the assets of its members and manages them professionally. The Commonfund remains
a leading asset manager for university endowments today, with almost 10% of all U.S. univer-
sity endowment mandates outsourced to it (by count of mandates). Moreover, in collaboration
with NACUBO (National Association of College and University Business Officers), it produces
benchmarking reports for U.S. university endowments up to today.1
2.3 The 1980s until Recent Years
In recent years, the investment complexity of the world’s capital markets has driven the
need for professional management of assets and prompted endowment trustees to hire full-time
investment professionals as CIOs.2 Since the 1980s, universities have shifted into allocating a
considerable amount of their portfolios to highly sophisticated alternative investments. Each
endowment has an investment office deciding on investment policy and which can choose to
1NACUBO is an advocacy organization devoted to improving management practices in the higher education
industry and compiles yearly reports about the investment practices of university endowments.
2For example, Harvard Management Company was founded in 1974 to manage the university’s endowment
and is made up of more than 13,000 individual funds invested as a single entity, as of 2019 according to their
endowment report.
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manage the funds itself (internally) or to delegate management to external asset management
firms. Outsourcing the investment management of endowment portfolios has become prevalent in
recent years. Regarding this trend, Mr Narv Narvekar, CEO of Harvard Management Company
(HMC), has noted in a memo to the university in 2017 that “In the past, HMC’s unique approach
of investing in internally-managed portfolios generated superior returns. In recent years, how-
ever, the tremendous flow of capital to external managers has created a great deal of competition
for both talent and ideas, therefore making it more difficult to attract and retain the necessary
investment expertise while also remaining sufficiently nimble to exploit rapidly changing oppor-
tunities”. All university endowments in the U.S. surveyed in the NACUBO reports have adopted
the external management approach for at least part of their portfolio.
The above suggests that endowment management has changed over the past century. En-
dowments have evolved into a class of sophisticated and professionally managed investors. My
prior is that this professionalization of the management of endowments makes them more likely
to able to exploit their long-term horizon and behave countercyclically later in the 20th century
compared to earlier. I examine this conjecture later in the paper.
3 Related Literature
The research questions of this paper are related to the literature on financial market crises,
institutional investor strategies around times of distress, and endowment investing.
The U.S. financial markets have suffered from multiple crises since the beginning of the 20th
century, and the literature has looked at their predictors, similarities, and contributing factors.
Several academics such as Jordà et al. (2011), Carlson (2015) and Danielsson et al. (2018) take a
historic perspective on crises using very long datasets spanning more than a century and study
their economic effects, the tools used to predict them and the effectiveness of their deterring
mechanisms. Others, such as Bordo et al. (2001) and Almunia et al. (2014) discuss similarities
among crises over time, their frequency, severity, and the policies used to remedy them.3
Economic historians have also explored the extent to which irrational investor behavior drove
bubble episodes preceding market crashes, with particular emphasis on 1929 in the U.S. (Nicholas
(2008), De Long and Shleifer (1991), Rappoport and White (1993), Rappoport and White (1994),
Shiller (2005)). This literature suggests that the aggregate behavior of (retail) investors was
3Other papers related to the literature of the history of economic crises are Eichengreen and Bordo (2003),
Shachmurove (2011), and Carlson and Wheelock (2016).
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procyclical. Moreover, Cohn et al. (2015) present evidence that a decline in stock prices makes
investors more fearful and risk averse, which could lead to an increase in selling that pushes prices
further down. This paper specifically considers whether institutional investors as represented by
endowments behaved differently both in 1929 and during other crisis episodes, given their ability
to invest with a long horizon.
This paper relates to the large literature on institutional investor herding behavior. Previous
research has shown that institutional investors such as mutual funds exhibit herding behavior
mainly due to their incentive contracts and reputational considerations. Maug and Naik (2011)
suggest that since managers are evaluated against one another, they tend to ignore their own
information to “go with the flow” and not deviate from their benchmark, while Dasgupta et al.
(2011) suggest that reputational concerns might also lead fund managers to imitate past trades.
Froot et al. (1992) show that if speculators have short horizons, they may herd on the same
information, trying to learn what other informed traders know.4 All the above studies suggest
that managers and investors tend to imitate one another. Although endowment objectives and
organizational structures differ from those of other investors, their managers still operate in
a competitive environment for investment performance. Therefore, it is interesting to explore
whether they also tend to exhibit herding behavior.
This study connects with the literature on institutional investor strategies around times
of distress, focusing mainly on the most recent financial crisis (2007-2008). Papaioannou et al.
(2013) discuss the procyclical behavior of institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual
funds during the crisis, while Duijm and Steins Bisschop (2018) also find evidence of procyclical
behavior by Dutch insurance companies during the crisis. Moreover, Manconi et al. (2012) discuss
the role of institutional investors such as mutual funds in propagating the crisis when faced with
liquidity shocks by selling corporate bonds. Ben-David et al. (2012) show that hedge funds
exited the U.S. stock market en masse as the financial crisis evolved, primarily in response to
the tightening of funding by investors and lenders. During the 1999-2000 dot-com bubble, young
inexperienced managers displayed procyclical behavior by increasing their technology holdings
during the run-up and decreasing them during the downturn (Greenwood and Nagel (2009)),
while U.S. life insurers contributed to the market crash post-2000 by selling equities in a falling
market (Impávido and Tower (2009)). Lastly, Dass et al. (2008) claim that herding behavior
related to contractual incentives of mutual funds partially caused the dot-com bubble.
4Other papers relevant to the herding and trading literature are Sias (2004), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Bulow
and Klemperer (2002) and Dennis and Strickland (2002).
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A competing view suggests that countercyclical behavior and rules to rebalance back to strate-
gic benchmarks around the time of the financial crisis have been favorable for institutions such as
Norway’s sovereign wealth fund (Dahlquist and Ødegaard (2018)). Perold and Sharpe (1988) also
suggest that countercyclical investment (that buys stocks when their prices fall and sells them
when they rise) capitalizes on reversals and outperforms a buy-and-hold strategy. Lakonishok
et al. (1994) suggest that value strategies produce higher returns because they exploit the sub-
optimal behavior of the typical investor. Additionally, Chien et al. (2012) find that intermittent
rebalancing more than doubles the effect of aggregate shocks on the time variation in risk premia.
Lastly, investment into equities by endowments during the 1930s crisis when equity prices were
falling (Goetzmann et al. (2010)) and sophisticated trading by hedge funds during the dot-com
bubble (reducing exposure to individual stocks before prices collapsed (Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2004))), provide notable examples of countercyclical behavior by institutional investors.
In this analysis, I look closely at the investing behavior of endowment funds during the most
important crises since the beginning of the 20th century. My hand-collected dataset covers a
longer period than previously available for other institutional investors, and includes the actual
asset allocations, characteristics and investment returns of endowments. Brown et al. (2010) sug-
gest that asset allocation policy can account for most of the time series variation in endowment
portfolio returns, while Ang (2012) and NBIM (2012) claim that rebalanced portfolios have dis-
played both higher returns and lower risk than a passive portfolio over a long period. Therefore,
studying the rebalancing decisions of endowments helps to uncover the trading behavior of large
institutional investors with a long investment horizon as well as their performance during crises.
Last, this paper relates to the literature on endowment investing. Lerner et al. (2008) investi-
gate the factors accounting for university investment success and attribute the dramatic growth
in endowment size to high investment returns related to the quality of student body and use
of alternative assets. They document that Ivy League schools managed their commitments to
alternative investments much better than non-Ivy League schools. Endowments have also been
successful in their security selection process. Lerner et al. (2007) find that endowments have ex-
ceptional selection abilities for venture capital partnerships. However, Sensoy et al. (2014) find
that the investment advantage of university endowments and their superior returns disappear
after 2000 mainly due to the maturation of the PE industry. Moreover, Brown et al. (2010) ex-
amine the relationship between asset allocation and performance and show that asset allocation
is an important determinant of the level and variation in the time series of returns. Further-
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more, they find that university endowments as a group do not generate significant risk-adjusted
returns. Similarly, Barber and Wang (2013) utilize style attribution models and find no outper-
formance for the average endowment once hedge fund and private equity indexes are included
in their model. Gilbert and Hrdlicka (2015) study the opportunity cost of building a large and
risky endowment in terms of forgone internal investment by suggesting a model which explains
the large heterogeneity in endowment size and allocation to risky assets. Last, Goetzmann and
Oster (2012) examine the role of strategic competition among university endowments on their
asset allocation shifts, with a special focus on the recent shift towards alternative investments.
Other influential studies on endowments have focused on risk taking, payouts, and spending
rules. Tobin (1974) proposes a spending rule based on the notion of intergenerational equity,
while Merton (1993) derives a model for optimizing investment and expenditure policy taking
into account the university’s objectives and sources of income. Dimmock (2012) tests the rela-
tionship between the volatility of non-financial income and endowment portfolios, showing that
universities with high background risk have lower portfolio standard deviation and that elite
universities hold riskier portfolios. Brown et al. (2014) find that endowments respond to market
shocks by reducing their payouts following negative shocks. Last, Brown and Tiu (2013) examine
spending rules revisions and find that larger endowments with lower historical portfolio returns
and payout levels are more likely to alter their spending formulas.
My study adds to the above literature by describing the evolution of U.S. university en-
dowment asset allocation over more than a century and by analyzing the extent to which they
are able to exploit their long horizon by investing countercyclically around the time of financial
crises.
4 Data
This paper employs a novel hand-collected dataset covering the investments of twelve U.S. uni-
versity endowments for the period 1900-2016. The endowments which make up the data set
are Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth University, Harvard
University, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania (UPenn), Yale University, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins University
(JHU) and Stanford University. All are large private doctoral institutions (i.e., universities of-
fering Ph.D. degrees) and the wealthiest university endowments in existence in the early decades
106
of the 20th century. The data contains individual endowment characteristics including their
asset allocation breakdown, endowment market value and investment returns (fiscal years end in
June).5
Table 1 describes the variables in the dataset, along with their sources. The data up to
1974 is hand-collected from the archives of the universities. The remaining sources include
University Treasurer Reports, reports from the National Association of College and University
Business Officers (NACUBO) and the Commonfund, the Higher Education General Information
Survey (HEGIS), the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), and the Vol-
untary Support for Education (VSE) dataset produced by the Council Aid to Education. The
NACUBO/Commonfund data is free of survivorship bias, as most educational institutions (and
their endowments) are quite enduring (Barber and Wang (2013)).
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the twelve university endowments in the sample, such
as the year of establishment, endowment fund size at selected dates in the sample (1926, 1970,
1985, 2016), and growth rates of endowment assets over the past century in real terms. Ivy
League Schools are reported in Panel A and Non-Ivy League Schools in Panel B. Ivy League
schools are older than Non-Ivy League schools. All endowments in the sample are quite large
and grew at a real annualized rate of about 4%. As of 2016, the largest endowments are Harvard,
Yale, and Princeton (H-Y-P), with Harvard reaching a market value of US$35 billion. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the most comprehensive long-run dataset covering the investments
of the largest U.S. university endowments.
In order to examine endowment investing behavior during financial crises, I source the dates
of the most important crises since the beginning of the 20th century using the data from Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009). I also cross-check these dates with the data from Robert Shiller’s website and
confirm that the crisis years coincide with the peaks and falls of the S&P500 index.6 I identify six
5For the early years of the sample and for any year in which endowments did not report their returns, I
calculate returns by multiplying the asset allocation weight for each endowment-year with a corresponding asset-
class benchmark return. Data on Harvard, Yale and Princeton (H-Y-P) stock holdings until the 1980s indicate
that endowments dramatically increased the number of stocks in their portfolio from the mid-1920s onwards. At
that time, H-Y-P held around 100 stocks in their portfolios, a number which rose to 300 in the late-1930s. After
adopting equity investing around the 1930s, all three endowments held large, diversified portfolios invested in
large-cap U.S. stocks (Foo (2013)). I therefore infer that endowments were closet indexers.
To further test the validity of this assumption, I calculate the difference of returns using this methodology with
the actual returns of the endowments for the years that they are available. I use the 1974-1983 decade as a sample
period because of the likelihood of the similarity with my estimated period. After the 1980s the management
of the endowments changed significantly with the introduction of alternative assets. Such a change would make
endowment returns to substantially diverge from conventional benchmarks. Taking the absolute values of the
differences in returns, my estimation methodology produces returns that are on average 3% different from the
actual returns with a standard deviation is 2% (on an average of 10.5% return). Therefore, I conclude that the
assumptions for estimating the endowment returns estimation at the beginning of the sample are reasonable.
6Robert Shiller’s data can be found here: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
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important crises, by the % decline of the S&P500 composite index from peak to trough around
the crises dates. The crises I examine are as follows: 1906-1907 (Panic of 1907, -38%), 1929 (Wall
Street Crash of 1929, -84%), 1937 (Economic Recession of 1973-74, -45%), 1973 (Stock Market
Crash of 1973-74, -25%), 2000 (Dot-Com Bubble of 2000, -43%) and 2008 (Financial Crisis of
2008, -51%).
5 Endowment Investing Over the Long Run
5.1 Asset Allocation Evolution
Endowment investing exhibited two major developments over the past century, the adoption
of common stock investing and the more recent shift into alternative assets. In this section, I
examine these asset allocation strategy changes, as well as the characteristics of the universities
initiating them.
5.1.1 Allocation Strategy Changes
Figure 1 plots the average endowment portfolio allocations to the four main asset classes: fixed
income, equity, real estate and alternative investments. Fixed income exposure is approximated
as the total allocation to bonds, mortgages and cash, equity allocation contains both common and
preferred stock, and alternative investments include private equity (venture capital and buyouts)
and hedge funds. The graph displays allocations starting from 1926, the first date with available
allocations for all endowments in the sample. While prior research concentrates on the period
after 1983, this data covers almost a century of investing.
At the beginning of the 20th century, endowments were unlike modern equity-focused port-
folios, allocating most of their portfolios to bonds. Equity was a new asset class and Goetzmann
et al. (2010) claim that equity investing during the early 20th century was deemed by investors
to be too risky to form a significant proportion of their portfolio. Therefore, the average endow-
ment in the early decades of the last century focused on bonds and allocated less than 10% of its
portfolio into equities, a proportion which rose to around 60% from 1960 to 1990. This equity
allocation was subsequently diminished during the past two decades, as funds shifted into other
risky assets.
The real estate weight in U.S. endowment portfolios remained at quite low levels during the
whole period. This practice contrasts with that of the wealthiest universities in the United King-
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dom, Cambridge and Oxford, which historically devoted a significant amount of their portfolio
to real estate. The maximum real estate allocation in the sample is that of Columbia University,
as a result of a gift of valuable property in Manhattan in the 1910s.7
Finally, alternative assets were introduced to endowment portfolios in 1980 and their pop-
ularity rose dramatically thereafter. The strategy involving private equity and hedge funds is
commonly known as the “U.S. endowment model” or “Yale model” (Swensen (2009)). The alloca-
tion to alternatives grew rapidly and alternatives today have replaced equities as the dominant
asset class in the largest university endowment portfolios, which now allocate an average of 50%
of their funds to alternatives. This portfolio shift was implemented predominantly at the ex-
pense of fixed income and equity investments, as discussed in Brown et al. (2010). Despite the
economic turmoil and the recent financial crisis, U.S. university endowments still follow the Yale
model and allocate a considerable proportion of their portfolios to alternative assets.
5.1.2 Early Adopters of Changes
Having distinguished these asset allocation trends, I examine the early adopters of these
moves. I focus on the allocation changes of equities and alternative investments. I explore the
extent of clustering among endowments in the timing of these major asset allocation shifts, and
whether this can be explained by endowment characteristics. To do so, I partition universi-
ties using multiple criteria such as size, age, geographic region and Ivy-League/Non-Ivy-League
university status. I hypothesize that larger institutions might have different investment oppor-
tunities and goals than smaller ones. Ivy League schools, which are older institutions, might also
have different preferences for asset classes or risk than Non-Ivy League schools. For instance, the
younger tech-biased institutions such as Stanford, Chicago, or Cornell might be more innovative
than the older Ivy-League schools such as H-Y-P, and move earlier than their peers into new
asset classes. Lastly, I hypothesize that geographically close universities might behave in similar
ways due to competition effects or the easier diffusion of new ideas due to proximity. I explore
some of these hypotheses in Figures 2 to 4, where I report the most distinctive patterns.
Concerning the allocation to equities, small endowments (Figure 2) and Ivy League schools
(Figure 3) were more aggressive in switching their allocation towards this new asset class at the
beginning of the period compared to the rest. Ivy League schools were also the first to move out
of equities in the past two decades. Regarding the allocation to alternative assets, the largest
7Today Columbia University is by far the largest landowner in New York City by number of addresses held.
The spike in the late 1970s is due to the revaluation of their Rockefeller Center holdings.
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and oldest endowments pioneered the move into this asset class starting from the 1980s. More
specifically, as already established in the literature and depicted in Figure 4, H-Y-P initiated
this move and continued their disproportionately higher allocation to alternative investments.
Their allocation to alternatives was also consistently higher than the average Ivy League school.
Overall, the above suggests that the older, Ivy League schools initiated both the move into
equities and the move into alternative assets.
This obviously invites the question as to whether there is some institutional memory or other
characteristic which enables these endowments to repeatedly take the lead.
5.2 Endowment Growth, Returns and Donations
This section examines the returns of the university endowments and the determinants of dona-
tions to the endowment. The value of U.S. university endowments has risen dramatically since
the beginning of the 20th century, and this evolution can be attributed to both their positive
returns as well as the inflow of donations to the universities, which makes examining them an im-
portant question. To demonstrate the above claim, Figure 5 replicates a graph included in Yale’s
2013 endowment report, titled "Endowment Growth Outpaces Inflation 1950–2013". Figure 5
shows that, even after taking into account inflation and gifts to the endowment, there remains
a large portion of Yale’s market value that came from superior investment performance, espe-
cially after the 1990s. Therefore, the growth in endowments’ market value can be disentangled
into three components, namely the effect of inflation, gifts to the endowment, and investment
performance. Figure 6 performs the same growth attribution for all universities in my sample
ranked from highest to lowest assets under management (AUM) in the beginning of the period.
The market value of each endowment as of 2016 is depicted over the columns. I find that in-
vestment performance has been the most important determinant of endowment AUM growth
for larger universities, while gifts have contributed more to the growth of the market value of
smaller institutions.
The above suggests that examining endowment returns and inflows of donations is crucial
to understanding endowment AUM growth. First, I estimate a long-term risk and return series
for all endowments in the dataset since 1927. Table 3 presents the long-term returns for the
endowments in terms of arithmetic as well as geometric returns, the standard deviations of their
arithmetic returns and Sharpe Ratios. The same statistics for Ivy League, Non-Ivy League
schools and relevant benchmarks are also reported. I estimate returns for the periods 1927-
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2016 (Panel A) and 1975-2016 (Panel B), as all universities publicly disclosed their endowment
returns from 1975. Prior to that date, I estimate endowment returns using their respective asset
allocations and benchmark returns for each asset class. The average U.S. university endowment
in the sample had a return of 10% (arithmetic return) or 9.2% (geometric return) over 1927-2016.
Ivy League endowments fared equally well as Non-Ivy League ones on average and were slightly
ahead of a balanced portfolio that constantly allocated 60% in equities (S&P500) and 40% in
bonds (AAA corporate bonds Barclays U.S. Investment Grade Index) in terms of their geometric
return. Since 1975, these endowments on average returned 12.5% (arithmetic return) and 11.8%
(geometric return) and beat the 60/40 benchmark by around 1.5% p.a. This outperformance is
consistent with the fact that the management of the endowments has improved over time.
Additionally, I test whether endowment performance positively affects donations. In Table
4, I regress the change in logs of donations to the endowment on lagged endowment returns. I
find that high past endowment performance plays a significant role in encouraging subsequent
donations to endowment funds (Column 1). However, this effect diminishes after two years
(Column 2). This finding is robust to controlling for changes in donor wealth (proxied by state
income per capita), changes in endowment size, and university fixed effects. This result suggests
that donors are more willing to donate money to university endowments with strong investment
management teams achieving higher investment returns. If the university cannot perform as well
or better than the donor with the assets, the donor is unlikely to transfer large gifts to it. Their
donations play, in this way, an essential role in promoting income to the university in the future.
I also examine whether the performance-donation relationship is asymmetric, namely whether
donors increase donations to high performers but reduce donations to low performers. In Column
3, I find no such asymmetric response when using a dummy variable to indicate a negative past
endowment return. Lastly, the impact of past returns on donations does not change around
financial crises. In Column 4, a dummy variable indicating the onset of a financial crisis appears
insignificant.
6 Endowment Investment During Financial Crises
6.1 Active Changes in Risky Asset Weight
I explore the risky asset allocation responses of endowments to six of the worst financial crises
in U.S. history. I treat equities as the risky asset in endowment portfolios. I calculate the active
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allocation changes for the following major crises since the beginning of the 20th century: 1906-
1907 (Panic of 1907), 1929 (Wall Street Crash of 1929), 1937 (Economic Recession of 1973-74),
1973 (Stock Market Crash of 1973-74), 2000 (Dot-Com Bubble of 2000) and 2008 (Financial
Crisis of 2008).
To capture active allocation changes, I use the methodology described in Calvet et al. (2009)
and Bams et al. (2016), which decomposes the total change in asset allocation into a passive
change (due to market fluctuations) and an active change (due to rebalancing). I estimate the
active changes using the equity and bond total return indices data from Dimson et al. (2018).
When the risky asset is equities, the actual change of the risky asset weight can be calculated
as:
Change inRisky AssetWeight = wt+1 − wt (1)
I define the passive risky asset return as the return of the equity index: 1+rt+1. For simplicity,
I am assuming that the portfolio is allocated between equities and fixed income, and the fixed
income part earns a return of 1 + rf . Therefore, the risky asset share in the portfolio could be
calculated as follows:
wp,t+1 =
wt ∗ (1 + rt+1)
wt ∗ (1 + rt+1) + (1− wt) ∗ (1 + rf,t+1) (2)
which is the zero-rebalancing weight in the risky asset. The active change of the endowment
risky asset weight due to investment decisions taken by the endowment is then:
ActiveRisky AssetWeight = wt+1 − wp,t+1 (3)
As an indication of allocation changes, Figures 7 and 8 depict cumulative active changes of
the equity allocation for the average endowment portfolio before and after each crisis.8 In both
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, endowments can behave countercyclically (sell before the crisis
onset, buy after), procyclically (buy before the crisis onset, sell after), or have no discernible
strategy.
Countercyclical behavior post the crisis onset is apparent for almost all episodes since the
beginning of the 20th century. Endowments invested in equities in falling markets the year
8The y-axis is measured in percentage terms and reported above each column are the p-values of the one-
sample t-test of the average active allocation change being statistically different from zero.
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directly after the Panic of 1907, during the years after the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the
years after the economic recession of 1937-38, and the Dot-Com Bubble of 2000. Moreover,
delayed countercyclical behavior by one year was observed for the Stock Market Crash of 1973-
74. Countercyclical behavior by endowments before the crisis onset is less pronounced, but it is
apparent in the year before the economic recession of 1937-38, the Dot-Com Bubble of 2000, as
well as the Financial Crisis of 2008. During these episodes, endowments decreased their exposure
to equities in rising markets. Overall, endowments are typically contrarian (Figure 8), and their
countercyclical behavior is more prominent during the most recent crises.
In unreported results for years 2000 and 2008, I redefine the risky asset as the sum of public
equities and alternative assets.9 In doing so, I recognize that the latter are typically illiquid
in nature and are perhaps less easily traded during crisis periods. My main findings remain
qualitatively unchanged when adopting this alternative definition. In the case of illiquid asset
changes, part of them could also be driven from the timing of the capital distributions of PE
firms. Robinson and Sensoy (2013) show that PE capital distribution takes usually place at the
top of the cycle (thus in the run-up) and capital call at the bottom of the cycle. However, the
results overall show that the allocation changes around the times of financial crises are due to
decisions of endowments to invest or disinvest from risky assets.
6.2 Rebalancing Regressions
I next explore the endowment-level relation between active and passive changes, and employ a
similar methodology to the one discussed and implemented in Calvet et al. (2009) and Bams
et al. (2016), testing the level of passive changes in the portfolio that is offset by active changes.
The specification is as follows:
ActiveChanget+1 = γ0,t+1 + γ1PassiveChanget+1 + γ2(Pre− Crash/Crash)t (4)
The variable of interest is the PassiveChange of the risky allocation of the portfolio, and
measures how much of the change in equity allocation is explained by passive equity change. A
fully passive endowment would be characterized by zero regression coefficients (γ0,t+1 = γ1 = 0).
Table 5 summarizes the regressions of the active change in the risky asset weight on its passive
change. Regression (1) estimates the above specification and shows that endowments offset the
9For this part of the analysis, the alternative assets indexes I use are the Cambridge Associates Private Equity
Index and the Hedge Fund Research Fund-Weighted Composite Index.
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passive change in their portfolios due to market fluctuations through active rebalancing.
In additional regressions, I include dummy variables which correspond to periods prior to
the crisis onset (Pre − Crash) and post the crisis onset (Crash) in Regressions (4) and (5).
The Pre− Crash and Crash Dummies are equal to 1 three years preceding a crisis onset (and
0 otherwise) and equal to 1 three years after a crisis onset (and 0 otherwise), accordingly. I
show that while rebalancing is strong over the whole sample period, it is, on average, stronger in
Pre − Crash periods. In Regressions (2) and (3), I also split the sample in periods of positive
and negative market returns, and find that rebalancing is strong in both sub-samples.
Overall, these results strengthen my conjecture that endowments did indeed behave counter-
cyclically as long-term investors since the beginning of the 20th century.
6.3 Allocation Strategies of Mutual Fund Investors Before and After Crises
This section examines whether the investing behavior of university endowments around times
of crisis differs from that of other types of investors. The literature has suggested that such
investors as mutual funds and pension funds invested procyclically in the most recent financial
crisis (Papaioannou et al. (2013)). In this section, I also examine how individual investors behave
around crises as proxied by their investment flows into and out of mutual funds.
I use data on U.S. mutual funds downloaded from Morningstar, including fund flows for
equity and bond mutual funds. Since the Morningstar data starts in 1989, I can only compare
them with those of endowments for the most recent crises, the Dot-Com bubble of 2000 and the
Financial Crisis of 2008.
Figure 9 shows that before the onset of both the 2000 and 2008 crises, equity mutual funds
experienced high net inflows, possibly due to the high liquidity and low financial market volatility
during the pre-crisis period. These inflows declined sharply following the peak of the Dot-Com
bubble in 2000 and turned into net outflows following the 2008 crisis. These patterns point to
procyclical behavior by investors in mutual funds during the last two crises. A different pattern
seems to be prevalent in the case of bond fund flows around crises. In contrast to equity mutual
funds, bond funds experienced net inflows after the onset of both crises, while having lower
inflows or even outflows before the onset of the crises. This suggests that investors in mutual
funds were chasing positive equity returns in the run-up to the crisis by putting money into
equity mutual funds and ignoring or even taking money out of less risky bond funds. Similarly,
post the crisis onset investors took money out of equity mutual funds in favor of bond mutual
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funds.
Overall, the results suggest that individual investors in mutual funds exhibited a procyclical
behavior around financial crises, in contrast to endowment funds.
7 Conclusion
University endowments are one of the oldest classes of institutional investors, display distinc-
tively long horizons and have pursued an investment approach that many investors subsequently
adopted. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to study how they allocated their portfolios
over the long-run and the determinants of these decisions, as well as how they invested during
the most important financial crises since the beginning of the 20th century.
In the first section of the paper, I document the distinctive trends in endowments’ long-term
asset allocation such as the early adoption of equity investing and the more recent shift into
alternative assets. I highlight that Ivy League schools were the ones initiating the switches into
the relatively new asset classes. I also find that on average these endowments performed in line
with the typical 60/40 benchmark over the half century up to the early 1970s, but thereafter beat
their benchmark. Furthermore, I show that endowment market value growth over the long term
was driven by a combination of good investment performance and donations. I also document
that past out-performance encourages future donations to endowments.
In the second section of the paper, I examine how these important and supposedly long-term
investors behaved around times of crisis. Calculating active risky asset allocation changes, I
find that endowments typically exhibited a countercyclical investment pattern, reducing their
allocation to risky assets such as equities and alternative assets before the onset of a crisis, and
increasing their allocation afterwards. Furthermore, this countercyclical behavior became more
pronounced in the two most recent crises, the Dot-Com Bubble and the 2008 Financial Crises.
In comparison, investors in mutual funds exhibited strongly procyclical behavior around the two
most recent crises.
Overall, this paper uses a novel, hand-collected dataset to help our understanding of the
investment strategies of university endowments over the very long run.
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Figure 2: Endowment Equity Allocation Weights (1900 to 2016): Relative Endowment Size
This graph presents average allocations for small vs large university endowments. The y axis is the
percentage of the endowment’s investment portfolio allocated in equities. The lines depict the equity
allocation of large and small universities, while the shaded area depicts the difference between these
allocations at any given year. “Large” is the average equity allocation of Harvard, Princeton, Yale,
Stanford, while “Small” is the average equity allocation of Brown, Cornell, Dartmouth, Johns Hopkins.
Figure 3: Endowment Equity Allocation Weights (1900 to 2016): Ivy League vs. Non-Ivy League
This graph presents average allocations for Ivy League vs. Non-Ivy League universities. The y axis
measures the percentage of the average endowment’s investment portfolio allocated in equities. The lines
depict the average equity allocation of Ivy League and Non Ivy League universities, while the shaded
area depicts the difference between these allocations at any given year. “Ivy League” universities are
Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia, University of Pennsylvania, Chicago, Brown, Cornell, Dartmouth,
while “Non-Ivy League” universities are Johns Hopkins, MIT, Chicago, Stanford.
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Figure 4: Endowment Alternative Assets Allocation (1980 to 2016): Harvard, Yale, Princeton
This figure presents average endowment allocations in alternative assets (private equity and hedge funds).
The y axis measures the percentage of the average endowment’s investment portfolio allocated in alter-
native assets. “HYP” stands for the average allocation of Harvard, Yale and Princeton. Ivy League
(ex-HYP) represents the average alternatives allocation of Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth and
UPenn, and Non Ivy League the average allocation of MIT, Chicago, Johns Hopkins and Stanford.
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Figure 5: Yale’s Endowment Market Value Growth (1950-2016)
This figure shows the growth of the Market Value of Yale’s endowment from 1950-2016, replicating a
figure that appeared in Yale’s 2013 endowment report and expanding the data to 2016. “Endowment Size
Inflated” is the endowment’s size in 1950 inflated with yearly inflation rates to 2016. “Gifts Inflated” are
the gifts to the endowment, also adjusted for inflation to 2016. The Market Values are expressed in $bil.
Figure 6: Market Value Growth Attribution of University Endowments (1950-2016)
This figure attributes the Market Value growth of each university endowment from 1950-2016 to the
performance of its portfolio and the gifts into the endowment (adjusted for inflation). The y axis calculates
the annualized growth rate of the endowments’ market value from 1950-2016. “Inflated Size” is the
endowment’s size in the beginning of the period (1950), inflated with all inflation rates to 2016. “Inflated
Gifts” are the gifts into the endowment, also adjusted for inflation. The columns are ordered from left to
right with respect to endowment size (highest to lowest) at the beginning of the period examined, namely
1950. The market value of the endowment in $bil as of 2016 is reported over each column.
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Figure 7: Active changes in the equity allocation of endowments around financial crises
This figure depicts the cumulative active changes in equity allocation of the average endowment portfolio
before and after six of the “worst” crises. The y-axis is the active change measured in percentage terms
and reported above each column are the p-values of the one-sample t-test of the average active allocation
change being statistically different from zero. Time t is the year of the onset of the crisis, t+1 is 12
months after the year of the crisis onset, t+2 is 24 months after the year of the crisis onset, etc. Column
t depicts the active equity asset allocation change from t-1 to t, column t+1 depicts the change from t
to t+1, column t+2 depicts the change from t to t+2, etc. Using Shiller’s monthly data, I note that the
1906, 1929 and 2008 crises had an onset during the second half of the “crisis onset” year. As endowment
portfolio characteristics are reported at fiscal years ending June, in order to correctly include the crisis
onset in the allocation changes at time t, I use data reported the following year.
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Figure 8: Average of all active changes in the equity allocation of endowments around financial
crises
This figure depicts the average of all active changes in the equity allocation of endowments around
the six financial crises I examine. The y-axis is measured in percentage terms and reported above each
column are the p-values of the one-sample t-test of the average active allocation change being statistically
different from zero. Time t is the year of the onset of the crisis, t+1 is 12 months after the year of the
crisis, t+2 is 24 months after the year of the crisis, etc. Column t depicts the active equity asset allocation
change from t-1 to t, column t+1 depicts the change from t to t+1, column t+2 depicts the change from
t to t+2, etc. Using Shiller’s monthly data, I note that the 1906, 1929 and 2008 crises had an onset
during the second half of the “crisis” year. As endowment portfolio characteristics are reported at fiscal
years ending June, in order to correctly include the crisis onset in the allocation changes at time t, I use
data reported the following year.
126
Figure 9: Equity and bond mutual fund yearly net flows around financial crises
This figure depicts the yearly net flows of equity and bond mutual funds around the two most
recent financial crises, 2000 and 2008. “Equity” figures depict the net flows of equity mutual
funds, and “Bonds” figures depict the net flows of bond mutual funds. Time t is the year of the
onset of the crisis, t+1 is 12 months after the year of the crisis, t+2 is 24 months after the year of the
crisis, etc. Column t depicts the active equity asset allocation change from t-1 to t, column t+1 depicts
the change from t to t+1, column t+2 depicts the change from t to t+2, etc. The net flow figures are
expressed in $USbil.
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Table 1: Endowment Variable Sources
This table presents the variables included in the dataset along with their year availability and source.
Variable Source
Asset Allocation Up to 1974: University Financial Reports
1974-2013: Financial Reports and NACUBO/Commonfund
Allocation and Investments 1900-1956: Book values from Treasurer Reports
1957-2013: MVs from Treasurer reports, NACUBO/Commonfund
Endowment Performance University financial reports and NACUBO/Commonfund
Endowment Assets Up to 1974: University Financial Reports
1974-2013: NACUBO/Commonfund
Donations Up to 1968: JP Jones Annual Survey
1969-2013: Voluntary Support of Education (VSE)
State Income per Capita FRED (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
Total Expenditure 1926-1968 and 2011-2013: University Financial Reports
1969-1986: Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS)
1987-2010: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)
Notes:
1. NACUBO stands for National Association of College and University Business Officers.
2. Please refer to Section 4 for details on the calculation of endowment performance for different time
periods.
3. VSE: For more information about the Voluntary Support of Education (VSE) and the Council for
Aid to Education, see: http://www.cae.org/content/pro_data_trends.htm
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Table 2: Endowment Sample Summary Statistics
The summary statistics reported in this table include the year of establishment of the
university each endowment supports, as well as the endowment’s size and annualized real
growth rate since 1926. The endowment size is reported in million dollars for four selected
dates throughout the sample (1926, 1970, 1985, 2016). Ivy League schools are reported in
Panel A and Non-Ivy League schools in Panel B.
University Year ofEstablishment
Size
($ mil)
Real Gr.
Rate
1926 1970 1985 2016
Panel A: Ivy League Schools
Harvard 1636 71 959 2,694 34,541 4.0%
Yale 1701 46 419 1,308 25,408 4.2%
Princeton 1746 16 325 1,519 22,200 5.2%
UPenn 1740 17 131 437 10,715 4.3%
Columbia 1754 56 266 979 9,041 2.8%
Cornell 1865 16 194 518 5,757 3.7%
Dartmouth 1769 9 125 386 4,474 4.1%
Brown 1764 10 86 222 2,963 3.5%
Panel B: Non-Ivy League Schools
Stanford 1885 29 271 1,083 22,398 4.6%
MIT 1861 17 308 770 13,181 4.6%
Chicago 1890 36 271 640 7,001 3.0%
JHU 1876 24 135 393 3,381 2.6%
Mean 29 291 913 13,421 3.9%
SD 20 233 690 10,287 0.80%
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Table 3: Endowment Performance and Risk
This table reports the average endowment arithmetic and geometric returns, the returns of the average
Ivy League and non-Ivy League institution in the sample as well as relevant asset-class benchmark
returns. Arithmetic Returns (Arith. Ret) are the average arithmetic returns of every calendar year,
Geometric Returns (Geom. Ret) are compounded returns over the whole period and Standard
Deviations (Std. Dev) are the standard deviations of the yearly arithmetic returns. The 60/40
benchmark is a balanced portfolio (60 percent invested in equities and 40 percent in bonds), rebalanced
annually. Panel A presents endowment performance and risk figures for the period 1927-2016, and
Panel B for the period 1975-2016.
Panel A: The period 1927-2016
University Geom. Ret Arith. Ret Std. Dev Sharpe Ratio
Brown 8.7% 9.5% 13.3% 0.43
Columbia 8.8% 9.5% 12.2% 0.46
Cornell 8.4% 9.3% 13.9% 0.39
Dartmouth 9.4% 10.3% 14.7% 0.45
Harvard 9.3% 10.0% 13.0% 0.48
Princeton 10.3% 11.0% 13.2% 0.55
Upenn 8.5% 9.3% 13.3% 0.41
Yale 9.9% 11.0% 15.1% 0.48
MIT 9.3% 10.1% 13.6% 0.47
Chicago 10.0% 10.9% 14.5% 0.48
JHU 8.3% 8.9% 10.7% 0.47
Stanford 9.3% 9.9% 11.3% 0.54
Average Endw. 9.2% 10.0% 13.2% 0.47
Ivy League 9.2% 10.0% 13.6% 0.46
Non-Ivy League 9.2% 9.9% 12.5% 0.49
60/40 9.0% 10.3% 13.6% 0.40
S&P500 9.9% 12.8% 26.2% 0.35
Panel B: The period 1975-2016
University Geom. Ret Arith. Ret Std. Dev Sharpe Ratio
Brown 10.9% 12.6% 12.7% 0.49
Columbia 11.3% 11.8% 10.1% 0.61
Cornell 10.3% 11.0% 12.7% 0.44
Dartmouth 11.9% 12.7% 11.8% 0.58
Harvard 11.9% 12.6% 12.1% 0.58
Princeton 12.8% 13.6% 12.8% 0.63
Upenn 11.2% 11.6% 11.2% 0.57
Yale 13.4% 14.2% 12.9% 0.67
MIT 12.2% 13.1% 14.4% 0.52
Chicago 12.6% 13.4% 14.6% 0.53
JHU 10.2% 10.7% 11.0% 0.50
Stanford 12.4% 13.1% 12.0% 0.63
Average Endw. 11.8% 12.5% 12.4% 0.56
Ivy League 11.7% 12.5% 12.0% 0.57
Non-Ivy League 11.8% 12.6% 13.0% 0.54
60/40 10.1% 10.8% 12.4% 0.45
S&P500 10.4% 11.7% 17.5% 0.38
130
Table 4: The impact of past endowment returns on subsequent donations
This table reports results of the log changes in donations to the endowment at time t regressed
on lagged endowment returns (time t-1, t-2 and t-3). I include controls such as the change in
the size of the endowment and the log change in income per capita of the state each university
belongs to (as a proxy for the donors’ wealth), from time t-1 to t. In column 3, Negative Ret
t-1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the past return of the endowment was
negative, and 0 otherwise. In column 4, Crash t-1 is a dummy variable indicating the onset of a
financial crisis the previous period, and Return t-1*Crash t-1 is the interaction variable of the
past return and the Crash t-1 variable. The regressions include endowment Fixed Effects and
the standard errors are corrected to allow for a fully general structure with heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation. The regression covers the period 1927-2016.
Dependent variable:
Change in log donations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Returnt−1 0.3756∗∗∗ 0.4085∗∗∗ 0.2462∗∗ 0.4107∗∗∗
(0.0911) (0.0924) (0.1171) (0.0977)
Returnt−2 0.2093∗∗
(0.0919)
Returnt−3 0.0051
(0.0953)
Crasht−1 0.0519
(0.0427)
Change log Sizet−1,t 0.2737∗∗∗ 0.2768∗∗∗ 0.2808∗∗∗ 0.2766∗∗∗
(0.0897) (0.0901) (0.0903) (0.0898)
Change log Income per Capitat−1,t 0.3125∗∗ 0.3225∗∗ 0.2882∗ 0.2986∗
(0.1582) (0.1610) (0.1594) (0.1587)
Negative Rett−1 −0.0733∗
(0.0404)
Returnt−1 ∗ Crasht−1 −0.2735
(0.2689)
Constant −0.0110 −0.0179
(0.0179) (0.0188)
Endw. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 973 973 973 973
R2 0.0307 0.0362 0.0342 0.0323
Adjusted R2 0.0277 0.0201 0.0191 0.0273
F Statistic 10.2461∗∗∗ 7.1856∗∗∗ 8.4772∗∗∗ 6.4579∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5: The effect of passive on active allocation changes
This table reports the pooled regressions of the active change on the passive change of equity,
in levels. Year t regressions include endowments that allocate their portfolios in risky assets
both at the end of year t minus 1 and at the end of year t.
Dependent variable:
Active Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passive Change −0.327∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗ −0.102 −0.262∗ −0.538∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.186) (0.258) (0.140) (0.143)
log(Size) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Crash Dummy −0.047∗∗∗
(0.015)
Pre-Crash Dummy −0.096∗∗∗
(0.016)
Constant −0.570∗∗∗ −0.723∗∗∗ 0.207 −0.083∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.107) (0.248) (0.006) (0.006)
Endw. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,063 799 252 1,063 1,063
R2 0.026 0.050 0.007 0.013 0.038
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.048 −0.001 0.011 0.036
Residual Std. Error 0.186 0.185 0.187 0.187 0.185
F Statistic 14.210∗∗∗ 20.970∗∗∗ 0.847 6.934∗∗∗ 21.073∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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All Pos Mkt. Neg Mkt. Pre-Crash Crash
Conclusion
This dissertation examines the investment choices of university endowments in the United States.
The essays shed light on the external manager selection of asset owners both in public and private
markets, their strategies over the long-run and their response to financial crises since the beginning
of the 20th century.
The three essays make important contributions to the literature on institutional investor behav-
ior. My first main finding is that peer effects among asset owners play a role in decisions about their
selection of external investment managers. Endowments with similar characteristics, especially in
terms of Carnegie Classification, geographic location and market value, are more likely to appoint
the same external investment managers. Endowments also follow their peers in the frequency of
external manager hiring and firing and respond faster to the specific manager hiring and firing de-
cisions of endowments in their peer groups. Taken together these results suggest that institutional
investor herding effects are prevalent not only in decisions about their financial assets, but also in
decisions about the investment managers of their portfolios.
My second essay examines how social networks affect external manager choices by an asset owner
such as an endowment in private markets. The analysis considers how U.S. university endowments
and PE (both BO and VC) managers gain access to each other through their network connections.
It also examines whether critical network positioning of institutions (endowments and PE managers)
plays a role in manager selection. VC networks were more developed than their BO counterparts
at the beginning of the sample, but both networks grew denser over time. The identity of centrally
located institutions has stayed the same throughout the sample. Central positioning of PE managers
in the network is positively associated with the number of new mandates they gain from other
university endowments in subsequent periods, as well as their investment performance. Moving
the focus from firm-level to individual-level networks, I find that if an individual was employed by
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an endowment in the past or is an alumnus of the university which the endowment supports, the
likelihood of her PE firm getting hired by the endowment rises significantly.
My third essay exploits data on the most important U.S. university endowments and shows that
these endowments were early movers into the new asset classes of the day - equities from the 1930s and
alternative assets from the 1980s. Ivy League schools led both these shifts. In terms of investment
performance, these endowments were in line with the typical 60/40 benchmark up to the early 1970s,
but thereafter beat their benchmark. Their market value growth over the long term is driven by a
combination of high investment performance and donations. I also find that their past performance
is positively related with future donations. Around times of financial crises, endowments typically
exhibit a countercyclical investment pattern. They reduce their allocation to risky assets such as
equities and alternative assets before the onset of a crisis, and increase their allocation afterwards,
an effect which is more prominent in the two most recent crises: the Dot-Com Bubble and the
2008 Global Financial Crisis. In comparison, investors in mutual funds exhibit strongly procyclical
behavior around these crises. The results suggest that endowments indeed exploit their long horizon
advantage in making asset allocation decisions.
Overall, this dissertation uses an extensive, hand-collected data set on university endowments to
contribute to our knowledge on institutional investor behavior. I establish new findings on manager
selection by asset owners in both public and private markets - particularly, the importance of peer
effects, and both professional and personal networks - and on the countercyclical asset allocation
strategy pursued by long-horizon investors such as endowments.
There are several directions in which I intend to take my future research. The recent introduc-
tion of ESG sections in the NACUBO data could help determine what influences the adoption of
such mandates by endowments and how it affects their investments, contributing to the expanding
literature of responsible investing. My long-run dataset could also be used to examine the effects of
changes in tax policy on charitable giving in the U.S. over a long period, as well as the contribution
of financial success to academic excellence (such as top faculty, awards, and university rankings).
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